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Summary findings
Sri lIanka's weak economic performance, although  tariff structure, and, possibly, reform customs (to reduce
compoiunded by the civil war and budgetary imbalance,  leakage and abuse).
Iargely reflects:  *  Rationalize employment, exit, and bankruptcy
* A stop-and-go pattern  of policv reform, because of  regulations and procedures.
political constraints - even thougIl the results of reform  nImprove  communications between government and
were generally positive.  the private sector.
* Weak economic management, resulting in high  *  Make the financial sector more competitive by
inflation and a high fiscal and balance of payments  legislating banking reform, giving state-owned banks
deficit.  more autonomy and putting private commercial banks
* Poor management of public spending.  on an equal footing with the two state banks, with the
*  Mixed performance in exchange-rate management.  ultimate goal of privatizing the state banks.
with periods of substantial overvaluation.  *  Strengthen the supervision of banking.
*  Financial policies that (despite recenit  *  Privatize insurance and pension funds to strengthen
improvements) hamper efficient financial intermediation.  the capital market.
* Prolonged trade protection,  followed by selective  *  In the agriculture sector: (1) privatize the estate
trade liberalization.  plantations, perhaps through long-term management
* Continued distortion  in agricultural policies.  contracts and the gradual sale of shares in assets, (2)
* Inflexible labor markets and, despite Sri Lanka's  reduce trade protection (especially on rice, wheat,
outstandinig track record on humiian  development,  potatoes, chilies, and onions), (3) implement land
problems with the quality of the labor force.  reform, (4) strengthen agricultural support (for example,
To address a substantially unfinished policy agenda, Sri  irrigation, research and extension, and rural
Lanka needs to:  infrastructure), and (5) possibly support rural financing
* Intensify efforts to peacefuilly  resolve civil conflict.  institutions.
*  Squarely address its macroeconomic imbalanices:  (1)  *  End government controls on hiring, firing, and wage
sharpiv redtice the fiscal deficit; (2) cur  back on public  setting, and rationalize (depoliticize) civil service
spending (including defense spending, with peace) and  employment decisions.
redefine spending priorities; (3) improve cost recoverv  *  Make the changes in education needed to improve
for public services; and (4) continue  improving the  the quality of the labor force (for example, improve
maniagement  of the exchange rate.  teacher training, courses in science and English as a
* In trade policy, eliminate most quantitative  second language courses, and skills training).
restrictions, further  reduce tariff protection,  simplify the
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Sri Lanka has  made very impressive  progress since independence in reducing
the incidence of poverty.  This is reflected in outstanding human development
indicators as well as when poverty is measured in consumption terms.  Despite
this progress,  Sri  Lanka  remains  a  poor  country  with  substantial  poverty.
Although Sri Lanka's per capita growth rate of 2.5% per annum over the past
thirty  years or so compares favorably  with  most of the  developing world, it  falls
much  short  of  the growth  rate  achieved  by  the high-performing  East  Asian
countries.  Thus, in 1960 Sri Lanka's per capita income in nominal dollars was
276% higher than in Indonesia,  46% higher than in Thailand, about the same as in
South Korea and about 50% lower than in Malaysia.  Some 30 years later, Sri
Lanka's per capita income is  now less than a 12th of that in  Korea, only a fifth
of  that  in Malaysia,  less  than a  third of Thailand  and  24% below  that  in
Indonesia.  A stronger  growth  performance along the  lines  of the  high-performing
East Asian economies would have allowed much deeper reduction in Sri Lanka's
poverty.
What factors explain  why, despite solid  human development, Sri Lanka's per
capita income has fallen far  behind the dynamic East Asian economies?  Using an
aggregative time  series  growth  model as well  as  a more disaggregated  and somewhat
heuristic approach the  paper shows  that  Sri  Lanka'  s  weaker growth  performance can
be explained by differences in the underlying policy framework.  Like the East
Asian  economies, Sri  Lanka put a  lot of  emphasis  on human development  and
equitable distribution  of income.  These  policies  did  pay off handsomely in terms
of strong human development and reduction in  consumption  poverty.  But Sri Lanka
was unable to fully exploit its good human capital base to increase its income
as rapidly as the high-performing East Asian economies for  a number of reasons.
First, Sri Lanka's investment and saving rates were lower than in the dynamic
East  Asian economies; in  particular the  domestic saving  rate  was very low.  Thus,
between 1960-92 Sri Lanka invested at an average rate of 20% of GDP while the
investment rates were 27% in Korea, 25% in Thailand, 24% in Malaysia and 21% in
Indonesia.  More strikingly, as compared  with  domestic saving rates  of 30% of GDP
in Malaysia,  25% in Korea, 24% in Thailand and 25% in Indonesia, Sri Lanka's
average  saving  rate  was  only  13%.  Second,  the  average  productivity  of
investment in Sri Lanka has also been much lower; the average return on capital
in Sri Lanka was about 21% as compared with 33% in Korea, 31% in Thailand, 27%
in Malaysia  and  26%  in  Indonesia.  Third, the performance  of  agriculture,
particularly over the past two decades, has been weak.  For example, over the
1970-92 period,  Sri  Lanka's  agriculture sector grew  at  about  2.3%  p.a.  as
compared  with  4.2%  in  Thailand,  4.1%  in Malaysia  and  3.5%  in  Indonesia.
Finally, Sri Lanka's overall export growth over the past thirty years has been
rather poor.  Thus, the  volume of  exports has expanded  at an average rate of only
1.6% between 1960 and 1992, as compared with 20% in Korea, 11% in Thailand and
10%  in  Indonesia.  Although manufactured  export performance  has  improved
substantially in  response to liberalization  policies since 1977,  the export base
remains fragile and narrowly concentrated on a small number of commodities.
These weaknesses in economic performance largely reflect the effects of
policy problems in  a  number of critical  areas,  although the ongoing civil  war has
further compounded the difficulties and added to the budgetary imbalance.  The
policy problems include: weak macroeconomic  management, reflected in relatively
high  fiscal and balance of payments deficit and high  inflation; weak public
expenditure management;  mixed performance  on exchange rate management,  with
periods  of  substantial  overvaluation;  a  long  period  of  substantial  trade
protection,  followed  by  trade  liberalization  on  a  rather  selective  basis
(agriculture  incentives  remain  distorted);  financial  sector  policies  that
continue  to  hamper  efficient  financial  intermediation  despite  some  recent
improvements; agriculture policies that have been least reformed over the past
30  years  and  continue  to  constrain  agriculture  performance;  and  policy
distortions that limit the flexibility of the labor  market.  Even in the area of
human development, where Sri Lanka has an outstanding track record, there are
concerns about the quality of the labor force.- ii  -
Reform efforts in the past sought to address many of the above policy
problems with varying degree of success.  The  main difficulty has been the stop-
go pattern of reforms due to political constraints, even though the results of
the reforms were generally positive.  With a new government voted into  power in
1994, there is a real opportunity for taking control and ensuring sustained
progress with the critical policy reforms.  In addition to intensifying efforts
to peacefully resolve the civil conflict, Sri  Lanka would need to strengthen and
sustain efforts to address the substantial  unfinished  policy agenda.  The nature
of these challenges and implications for future reforms are discussed below.
Macroeconomic Management:  The task of securing and maintaining a stable
macroeconomic environment has proven to be  the Achilles Heel of Sri Lanka's
economic management throughout the  period.  Fiscal deficits have  generally been
high for the entire  period.  The balance of  payments  deficits were relatively low
up to the late 1970s, but have expanded since 1979.  To a large extent, these
deficits in the balance of payments and the fiscal account reflect the surge in
concessional  foreign  aid since  the  late  1970s. Nevertheless, large  macroeconomic
imbalances, particularly fiscal deficits, have contributed to a rapid growth in
domestic  and  international  indebtedness,  fueled a  relatively  high  rate  of
inflation,  and  complicated  monetary  policy  management  in  Sri  Lanka's  open
economy.  Although  the  growth  in  international  debt  did  not  create  any
significant debt servicing  problem partly because of the  high concessionality of
the debt  flows, the growth in domestic debt has  generated some elements  of
dynamic  instability.  Thus,  in  1992,  the  government's  interest  payment
obligations (mostly  on  domestic debt) ate  up almost  6% of GDP or a third  of total
tax revenue.
Clearly, a major challenge for Sri Lanka in the coming years will be to
squarely address its  macroeconomic imbalances.  Despite good progress in recent
years to bring down the fiscal deficit from double to a single digit number, a
fiscal deficit of 8-9% of GDP is unsustainably large.  Given the already large
stock of public debt, Sri Lanka cannot continue to run a deficit in its primary
budget balance for any substantial period in the future without running into a
financial crisis.  So, there is a need to convert the primary  deficit into
surplus to maintain internal balance.  The magnitude of the fiscal effort is in
the range of 4-5% of GDP.  In view of Sri Lanka's already good tax effort  (19%
of GDP), much of the fiscal deficit reduction will need to come from further
expenditure  cutbacks  and  redefining  public  expenditure  priorities.  Rapid
progress with the peace initiative will help in this task by reducing defense
spending.  However,  there  is  some  further  scope  for  additional  revenue
mobilization through better cost recovery policies for public services.  Lower
fiscal deficit will help raise domestic saving and reduce inflation through
reduction in  excess demand resulting from  excess  money supply.  It  will also help
contain the pressure on domestic interest rates.
The management of the exchange rate  has improved  considerably in the 1980s
with  the unification  of  the exchange  rate and  the  move  to  a  crawling  peg
adjustment mechanism.  But a combination of large  government spending and large
capital  flows, especially  official aid, has generated  pressure  on the  real
exchange rate  (RER)  to appreciate.  While exports have continued to do well,
following the trade and investment reforms of the 1977-82 and 1990-92 periods,
there  is  a  substantial  risk that  the continued  RER  appreciation  will  hurt
exports.  A reduction in  government spending  and lower  fiscal  deficits will again
help.  Careful management of  foreign aid and private capital  flows will  be
necessary to avoid large demand pressure in the non-traded sector.  Financial
deepening through  further financial sector deregulation will also assist  in
avoiding an appreciation of the RER.
Trade and Industrial Policies:  The reform of trade and other policies to
promote industrial development has been the subject of debate in Sri Lanka and
outside.  Sri Lanka's  own experience  with trade  protection  has shown the  pitfalls
of  relying  on government intervention  for  industrial  development.  Inward  looking- iii  -
policies of the 1970-77  period, for example, seriously hurt exports and sharply
reduced the growth of the manufacturing sector.  On the other hand, the positive
response  of  exports  and  the  manufacturing  sector  to  trade  and  other
liberalization policies since 1977 suggest the potential benefits of further
liberalization.  So, it  would seem that Sri  Lanka's development objectives would
be better served through reliance on neutral incentives.
Notwithstanding good progress in liberalizing trade policies,  there  is
substantial scope for further reducing the bias against exports induced by the
trade policy  regime.  While many of the quantitative restrictions have been
eliminated, a number of restrictions affecting particularly agriculture remain
in  place.  Moreover, a  combination  of specific  duties, surcharges,  exemptions and
waivers has resulted in a fairly complex tariff regime.  These have continued to
impart a bias against exports and have generally reduced investment efficiency.
Future trade policy reforms should concentrate on eliminating most quantitative
restrictions,  further reducing tariff protection and  simplifying  the tariff
structure.  To ensure proper implementation of these reforms, a reform of the
customs department may also be needed.  Options here include use of external
assessment firms (such  as the SGS) for  preshipment inspection.  Other countries,
such as Indonesia, have successfully used this option to minimize leakages and
abuse.
Sri Lanka continues to rely on a number of fiscal incentives (tax  holidays
and import duty exemptions) to promote private investment, especially in the
manufacturing sector.  Particularly, since 1990, Sri Lanka has offered generous
tax incentives to promote  foreign investment and  exports.  Overall,  these
incentives  distorted  resource  allocation  and  contributed  to  macroeconomic
imbalance by reducing budgetary revenues.  In light of these problems, a better
policy option would be to replace tax holidays with:  (i)  a low flat corporate
rate of taxation consistent with international standards; and (ii)  limited use
on investment tax credit aimed at new investments  which are consistent with Sri
Lanka's long-term development needs.
Sri Lanka has come a long way in deregulating its investment licensing
regulations.  However, a  number  of  regulatory restrictions  in  the area  of
employment, exit and bankruptcy procedures continue to impede  investment in
manufacturing and services.  The flexibility  of labor  market should  be increased
(discussed below)  while the Companies Act and the Bankruptcy Law  should be
simplified and made more flexible to facilitate winding up of business when
needed.
A notable feature  of  the  East  Asia experience  is  good communication  between
the government and business which contributed to the development of a business-
friendly  environment.  In  addition  to  a  generally favorable  business environment,
formal mechanisms  were established in a number of countries to have regular
consultation  between government and  business  on relevant  policies.  The focus  was
on improving competition  and sharing information,  rather than  collusive behavior
for rent seeking.  Similar consultative arrangement between private sector and
the Sri Lankan government might be very useful in disseminating information,
developing right policies and building consensus, and proper implementation of
policies.
Financial Sector Policies:  Past reforms in Sri Lanka's financial sector
have helped to deepen the financial sector, as indicated by the growth in the
ratio of bank deposits to GDP.  This has contributed positively to increasing
private saving and helped in reducing the adverse effects of high government
expenditure and large aid inflows on the RER.  Yet, a substantial unfinished
agenda remains.  The financial sector remains much less developed than in the
East Asian high-performing economies.  For example, even  with past progress, the
deposit to GDP ratio is  only 24% in Sri Lanka as compared with 38% in Korea, 48%
in Indonesia, 57% in Malaysia and 78% in  Thailand.  Sri Lanka has moved well in
deregulating interest rates.  However, a major constraint that remains is the- iv  -
dominance  of inefficient,  state-owned  banks. Despite  poor financial  performance,
these banks have continued to dominate the financial sector because of various
government support including  privileged  access to  deposit  sources.  The  resultant
lack  of competitive  pressure has reduced  both the level and quality of financial
intermediation.  Quality has suffered due to two reasons.  First,  the state-
owned banks have been used as instruments of government policy to direct credit
to politically determined beneficiaries, often without regard to financial or
economic viability.  Second, these banks have played the role of market-makers
in  determining  domestic  lending  rates.  Consequently,  while  inefficiency
resulting from over-staffing and bad portfolio has  raised the cost of doing
business, the effect of these inefficiencies  on cost  has often been passed on to
the borrowers in terms of higher loan rates.  As a result, the spread between
average deposit and lending rate has been very high.
Recent steps to increase competition has included efforts to legislate a
banking reform act that would provide greater autonomy to the state-owned banks
and  place the  private commercial  banks on the same  footing  as the two state-owned
banks.  A speedy implementation of this measure will  be an important first step.
Nevertheless, this by itself will not be adequate.  The main policy change that
is  needed to enhance the dynamism  of the financial  sector is to  privatize the two
state banks.  Along with this key reform, steps will also need to be taken to
strengthen supervision capacity of the Central Bank to ensure the soundness of
the banking sector in a more competitive environment.  Sri Lanka's small but
growing  capital market has shown dynamism in recent years as direct  foreign
investment has been growing in response to the various deregulation measures.
Nevertheless, the  state's control  over the  use  of insurance  and  pensions fund  has
tended to  reduce the  effectiveness of  the capital  market.  Not surprisingly,  most
of resources mobilized in these institutions have been channelled toward the
purchase of T-bills to reduce the cost  of the  budget deficit.  The privatization
of insurance companies has been under consideration for sometimes as a way of
increasing competition and efficiency  in insurance.  Implementation of  this
reform  will also  benefit capital  market  development  by allowing  more flexible use
of insurance funds.  Similarly, an independently  managed public pensions fund is
also likely to help the capital market as investment decisions are likely to be
guided  by profitability  considerations rather  than dictated  by  the need  to
finance the budget deficit at lower cost (i.e.,  purchase of T-bills).
Agriculture Policies:  Unlike  the  East  Asian  economies,  Sri  Lanka's
agriculture sector  performance has generally  been weak.  Value-added in the tree
crops sector has virtually stagnated and paddy experienced mixed performance.
Other crops (chillies,  onions, potatoes) have done relatively better; but there
are serious efficiency concerns in  many of these crops.  Factors contributing to
the sector's poor performance  include nationalization of estate plantations,
trade policy distortions, absence of a well-functioning land market and weak
support services.  In the tree crops sector, the main challenge is to  privatize
the estate plantations.  Some progress has been made in this regard since 1992.
The  reform  effort,  however,  has  been  slow  and  hesitant.  Given  political
sensitivity, the implementation of privatization could be phased over a longer
period through a system  of long-term  management contracts (50  years or more) and
gradual sale of assets in the form of shares.  At the same time, the Government
should remove all remaining restrictions  on marketing, refrain from involvement
in wage setting and restructure tree crop research institutes to allow greater
private sector involvement.
In the non-plantation agriculture sector, reforms are needed in the areas
of trade, land markets and support services.  The most important trade policy
issue affecting agriculture concerns the control of rice trade. There are also
restrictions on import of wheat, potatoes, chillies and onions.  Except in the
case of  wheat,  the main  aim  of  trade controls  has been  to protect  farmer
incentives.  As a result  of these  policies, a fairly  distorted  production pattern
has emerged.  As in the case of the manufacturing sector, neutral incentives
would probably be better for  boosting agriculture  performance than  a strategy ofguiding  specific  production  activities  through  trade protection.  Even  in
agriculture, a small economy  like Sri  Lanka  will likely  benefit  more from opening
up to trade.  Reconciling objectives of food security and protection of farmer
income with production efficiency considerations could involve some trade-offs,
but these can be made consistent with outward orientation.  Thus, while lower
trade protection for rice,  onions, potatoes and chillies could  hurt producers in
the short-term, the medium-term gains from diversification toward other, more
efficient crops  would likely  improve total  income  from  agriculture.  In  addition,
rice  and other farmers facing lower  protection  need not lose  over the medium term
if better support services are provided to increase productivity.
Changes in trade policy alone will not lead to greater efficiency  and
higher growth in agriculture.  A major constraint that needs to be addressed as
well is the lack of  a well-functioning land  market due to the state's role as the
dominant  landlord,  restrictions  on  land  sale and  use,  and  inadequate  land
registry.  The Government has been working on a legislation to facilitate land
titling and to speedily resolve land  disputes.  This effort should  be translated
into action as soon as possible.  In  addition, measures are needed to give clear
land titles to settlers in colonies, effectively implement Agrarian Services
Amendment Act of 1991 (by  which all restrictions on land use were removed) and
prepare a program to divest to the private sector all government-owned  land
presently  devoted  to  agriculture.  Third,  there  is  a  need  to  boost  the
availability  of  efficient  support  services.  This  entails  (i) making  more
efficient use of irrigation  water through better O&M, supported  by cost recovery
and farmer involvement in canal maintenance;  (ii) strengthening research and
extension by allocating more budgetary resources, greater outreach effort to
disseminate  research  findings,  involving users  in determining  the  research
agenda, and using private sector research facilities;  (iii) making a careful
assessment of rural infrastructure needs, particularly rural roads, and support
priority needs through  public expenditures.  A careful review of rural financing
services is also needed; based on this review there  may be a need to support the
development of rural financing institutions.  The nature of this support should
be based on lessons of experience from  other countries (e.g.  the  Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh, the Kuppedes in Indonesia).
Policies  for  Enhancing  Labor  Market  Flexibility  and  Labor  Quality:  An
important feature of the East Asian experience has been the flexible working of
the labor market, with employment and remuneration decisions largely based on
market factors.  The growth in employment and wages came from rapid economic
growth and not through  non-market government interventions.  Labor  market in  Sri
Lanka has not worked as efficiently.  An estimated third of total employment,
belonging to the public sector and large private enterprises, has been subject
to  various  types  of  non-market  interventions.  As  a  result, wages  in  the
regulated sector have been higher than their  market clearing levels and there is
an excess supply of labor in this market.  Since employment in this regulated
sector is  associated  with a  much larger  share  of  total investment  and value-added
than the  employment share, the  economy-wide ramifications  of the distortions for
economic growth and employment  have  been  quite serious.  The  adverse effects have
been  compounded by  the relatively  low quality  of  Sri Lanka's  labor  force,
notwithstanding Sri Lanka's overall strong achievements in human development.
Policies  for enhancing  the flexibility of labor market  would need  to
eliminate the distortions in the employment and remuneration decisions in the
regulated market.  The main reforms include removing government involvement in
the  hiring  and  wage  setting  decisions  in  the  state  plantations  and  other
corporations, deciding civil service  employment on  the  basis  of needs rather than
political expediency, and eliminating the TWA (termination  of workers act which
restricts labor  mobility in  large  public enterprises)  . Admittedly, implementing
these reforms will pose a major challenge in view of political sensitivities.
On  the other  hand,  a  failure  to address  these distortions  might  seriously
constrain Sri Lanka's ability to  attain the  NIC status.  The situation calls for
a sensitive handling of these reforms but not an indefinite postponement.- vi  -
Reforms  for improving the quality  of labor would need  to  address  the
concerns in both general education and vocational training.  There is a need to
improve the composition of public spending on primary and secondary education.
At  present most resources  go to  finance  teacher  salaries, leaving  very little for
materials and supplies.  Teachers are generally in excess supply in the cities.
So, a reduction in the number of teachers in the cities will reduce the salary
bill and release resources for  essential school supplies and  materials.  Greater
emphasis on science and English as a second language will improve the ability of
students to respond better to the needs of the job market.  More generally, a
careful review  of the  curriculum and appropriate  revisions in light of  Sri
Lanka's development needs and market demand will help improve the quality of
human capital.  Efforts to enhance the quality of trainers--the teachers--are
also  needed.  Sri  Lanka  needs  to  rethink  its  skill  development  program.
International evidence shows that training programs are most likely to succeed
when  sponsored  and implemented  in  collaboration  with  prospective  employers. There
are various ways how Sri Lanka could reorganize its training programs to  make it
demand based. The main need is to ensure a strong involvement of the private
sector (employers) in the design and implementation of the training programs.I. INTRODUCTION
1.  Sri  Lanka  has  made  very  impressive  progress  since  independence  in
reducing  the  incidence  of  poverty.  This  is  reflected  in  terms  of  human
development  as well  as when  poverty  is measured  in consumption  terms.  Indeed,
Sri Lanka's  progress  with  human  development  stands  out when  compared  with  other
countries  at similar  income  levels.  The progress  with poverty  reduction  was made
possible  by a combination  of two factors:  (i) a strong  push  on human  development
and  equitable  income  distribution  through  public  expenditures;  and  (ii)  a
relatively  good  growth  performance--3%  per  capita  GNP growth  rate  over  the past
40 years,  exceeding  the rate achieved  in South Asia,  Latin America  and  low income
countries  in general.
2.  Despite  this progress,  Sri Lanka'  s poverty problem  remains  substantial.
While  the  improvement  in  human  development  has  been  outstanding,  Sri  Lanka
remains  a  low  income  economy.  Although  Sri  LankaIs  per  capita  growth  rate
compares  favorably  with  most  of the developing  world,  it falls  much  short  of the
growth  rate  achieved  by the high-performing  East  Asian  countries  (see Table  1).
Thus,  in 1960  Sri  Lanka's  per  capita  income  in nominal  dollars  was  276%  higher
than  in Indonesia,  46% higher  than  in Thailand,  about  the same  as in South  Korea
and  about  509  lower  than  in  Malaysia.  Some  30  years  later,  Sri  Lanka's  per
capita  income  is now  less  than  a 12th  of that  in Korea,  only  a fifth  of that  in
Malaysia,  less  than  a  third  of  Thailand  and  24%  below  that  in  Indonesia.  A
stronger  growth  performance  along  the  lines  of  the  high-performing  East  Asian
economies  would  have  allowed  much  deeper  reduction  in Sri Lanka's  poverty.
Table  1:  Per  Capita  GDP  in Sri Lanka  and  Comparators,  1960-92
(US Dollars,  Current  Prices)
At Nominal  Exchange  Rate  Per  Capita  Real  GDP  Growth  Rate
1960  1992  (1960-92,  % p.a.)
Sri  Lanka  142  540  2.5
Korea  156  6790  6.5
Malaysia  275  2790  4.2
Thailand  97  1840  5.2
Indonesia  51  670  3.4
Source:  WDR  (various  issues).
3.  What  factors  explain  why,  despite  solid  human  development,  Sri  Lanka
has  fallen  far behind  the dynamic  East  Asian  economies  in raising  its per  capita
income?  What  are  the  key  lessons  for  the  future,  especially  in view  of  Sri
Lanka's  aspirations  to  achieve  the  status  of  a  newly  industrializing  country
(NIC) around  the turn  of this  century?  These  are some fundamental  questions  the
Sri  Lankan  policy  makers  need  to  ask  in preparing  to  address  the  development
challenges  it faces  in the  mid-1990s  and  beyond.
4.  The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to analyze  growth  performance  in  Sri
Lanka  over  the past  three decades  with a view  to identifying  the key factors  that
explain  past  performance  and drawing  policy  lessons  for the future.  The analysis
hopefully  will  provide  a useful  input  to the Sri Lanka's  own search  for the right
policy  mix aimed  at improving  the living  standards  of its population.  The paper
is organized  as follows.  Section  II contains  a brief  review  of the cross-country
growth  analysis  literature.  Based  on  this  review,  an aggregative  growth  model
for  Sri  Lanka  that  links  policies  with  the  growth  outcome  is  developed  and
estimated  using  time  series  data.  Given  the  inherent  limitations  of  an
aggregative  time  series  growth  model,  in Section  III the discussion  focusses  on- 2 -
a more detailed, heuristic review of the  key policy parameters that underlie Sri
Lanka's performance.  The analysis here uses the East Asian  experience as a
paradigm.  In  particular, specific attention  is  given to  the  experience of  Korea,
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia as comparators.  Finally, the implications for
future policy are indicated in Section IV.
II.  HOW POLICIES INFLUENCE ECONOMIC GROWTH--STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
5.  In  the traditional neo-classical framework  a la Solow (1956),  the rate
of economic  growth is  determined  by the rate  of accumulation  of capital and labor
and by exogenous technical progress.  In this framework, policies have only a
transitory effect.  The steady state per capita growth rate is dnly a function
of exogenous technical change, unrelated to  policies.  Since the seminal  work of
Solow (1956),  there  has  been considerable  interest  in  examining  whether long-term
economic growth is exogenous (unrelated  to policy) or endogenous in the sense
that  technical  change  is  influenced  by  policies  and  therefore  becomes  an
endogenous variable.  Interesting  modifications along these lines include Romer
(1986) and Lucas  (1988)  . Romer and Lucas endogenize  technical progress  by
allowing for externalities in the accumulation of physical and human capital
respectively.  Thus, policies that encourage or discourage physical or human
capital will affect long-term growth accordingly.  Much empirical work has been
devoted in  recent  years to identifying  policies that  influence  physical and  human
capital accumulation and the efficiency with which these are used.
6.  Sunmary  of  Cross  Country  Evidence:  A  brief  examination  of  the
empirical growth literature suggest a role for the following determinants of
growth.  The results reviewed and reported here are only indicative and are not
meant to be exhaustive or conclusive.
o  Initial conditions:  The role of initial conditions is expected to
pick up the influence of two factors.  First, in endogenous growth
models the initial endowment  of human capital will allow a faster rate
of technological progress; so countries with better equipped initial
human capital stock are expected to grow  faster, ceteris  paribus.
Second, in the neoclassical model, poorer countries with low initial
capital-labor ratios are expected to grow faster because of higher
marginal product of capital.  Using a sample of 98 countries for the
period 1960-85, Barro (1991)  finds that for a given starting value of
per  capita  GDP, a  country's  subsequent growth  rate  is positively
related  to  the  initial  level  of  human  capital  as  measured  by
enrollment  ratios.  As  well, holding constant  a set  of variables
including human capital, initial  per capita GDP is  negatively related
to  per capita income growth.  A similar result is also reported by the
World Bank's East Asian Miracle Study (1993).
o  Fiscal  policy:  A  number  of  fiscal  variables  has  been  used  in
empirical  work.  Three  commonly used  variables  are  the  share  of
government  consumption  in GDP,  the share of public  infrastructure
investment in GDP, and the GDP share of public spending on health and
education.  Government consumption is  expected to lower  growth through
distortionary taxation or expenditure  programs.  Public investment in
infrastructure  is  expected  to  raise  the  productivity  of  private
investment and growth.  Public spending on education and health is
expected  to raise  growth  by  increasing labor  productivity.  Barro
(1991) finds a negative association between government consumption
(excluding defense and education) as a share of GDP and per capita
GDP.  Easterly and Rebelo  (1993), in a cross-country study for the
period  1970-88,  find  that  public  investment  in  transport  and
communication is positively correlated  with growth.  Similar evidence
on the positive impact of public infrastructure investment on growth
was also reported by Baffes and Shah (1993).o  Outward orientation:  Greater outward orientation is expected to have
a positive impact on growth, resulting from better access to markets,
finance and technology.  Many studies have found a positive influence
of outward orientation on growth.  These include Havrylyshyn  (1985),
Edwards  (1989) and Dollar  (1990).  In a more recent  study Dollar
(1992) obtains  results  which  show  that  trade  liberalization  and
appropriate exchange rate management improves growth performance.
o  Monetary and financial  policies:  Empirical investigations of the role
of monetary and credit  policies, including  the impact  of inflation, on
growth have yielded mixed results in a cross-country framework.  The
East  Asian  Miracle  Study  (1993)  finds  a  significant  negative
relationship  between  inflation  and  growth  in  a  cross  country
framework.  But time series investigation  for Korea,  Taiwan and China,
however, do not yield significant coefficients.  Regarding financial
development  and growth, Goldsmith  (1969), Mckinon  (1973) and  Gelb
(1989)  find  a  positive  relationship  between  growth  of  domestic
financial market and economic growth.  However, one unresolved issue
is the direction of causality.  Also, Gelb's finding of a significant
positive  statistical relationship between growth and real interest
rate has been called in question by the East Asian Miracle Study.
o  Inequality and growth:  Income distribution can affect growth through
different channels: increased  inequality causes greater conflict over
distributional issues,  thereby  encouraging  greater intervention in  the
economy; also, greater inequality can hinder human capital formation.
Alesina and Rodrik (1991)  found that higher inequality tends to lower
growth  in  the  subsample  of  democracies  but  is  insignificant  in
nondemocratic countries.  Persson and Tabellini  (1991) find similar
results.  Clark  (1992) found that growth was negatively affected by
inequality.
7.  Implications for Sri Lanka:  The above review suggests that it is
possible to investigate Sri  Lanka's growth outcome  using a statistical framework
that  seeks  to explain  this growth  in terms of underlying policies--fiscal,
monetary, financial, trade and income distribution (see  also Box I)
8.  The statistical investigation of the determinants of growth  in Sri
Lanka is premised on the hypothesis that per capita growth rate depends on the
level and the efficiency of use of investment.  The investment rate and its
efficiency in turn depend upon a number of policy variables.  These include:
fiscal  policy,  monetary policy, financial  policy  and trade  policy.  Fiscal  policy
is measured in terms of two variables:  share of government consumption in GDP
and public spending on health and education;  monetary and financial  policies are
approximated by  the rate of inflation and the real interest rate; trade and
external payments policies are measured in terms of two variables: black market
premium and the rate of growth of exports.  The role of income inequality could
not be investigated due to lack of time series data.  The regression was run
using OLSQ on annual time series  data over the  period 1970 to 1992.  The data  was
not extended to 1960  because of concern  with the reliability  of the data base for
some of the earlier years.  A slope dummy for the investment rate variable was
included to capture the impact of the civil conflict over the 1983-88 period.-4-
Box 1:  Role of Initial Conditions
What are the  possible effects  of initial  conditions?  That is to what
extent,  if  any,  Sri  Lanka  was  left behind  by  Korea,  Malaysia,
Thailand and Indonesia because it had poorer initial endowment  of
human. capital  or  because  Sri  Lanka  was  richer  and  therefore
experienced diminishing marginal productivity?  Let us first look at
the initial level of human capital  (see Tables 2 and 3).  School
enrollment  ratios in 1960 were  roughly comparable for Sri Lanka,
Malaysia  and  Korea,  while  Thailand  and  Indonesia  lagged  behind.
Indeed,  Sri  Lanka  had  an  edge  over  the  comparator  East  Asian
economies in terms of  other indicators of human development.  One
cannot, therefore, argue that the East Asian economies grew faster
because  they had better access to human capital.  What about  the
initial level of  GNP per capita?  Here,  it  is hard  to  find any
systematic relationship.  In nominal dollars, Sri Lanka's per capita
income was  roughly comparable with  Korea, about half  of  that of
Malaysia and much higher than in Thailand and Malaysia.  In PPP-
adjusted terms, Sri Lanka's income  was about the same as in  Thailand,
lower than in Malaysia and higher than in Korea and Indonesia.  So,
it appears implausible that these other countries grew faster than
Sri  Lanka partly because their initial  per capita incomes  were lower.
Table 2:  School Enrollment Ratios in Sri Lanka and Comparators
(% of Age  Group  Enrolled)
Primary  Secondary  Tertiary
1960  1991  1960  1991  1960  1991
Sri Lanka  95  108  27  74  1  5
Korea  94  107  27  88  5  40
Malaysia  96  93  19  58  1  7
Thailand  83  113  12  33  2  16
Indonesia  67  116  6  45  1  10
Source:  WDR  (various  issues).
Table  3:  Other  Social  Indicators  for  Sri  Lanka  and Comparators
Infant  Life Expectancy  Adult
Mortality Rate la  at Birth  Literacy Rate
1960  1992  1960  1992  1960  1992
Sri Lanka  71  18  63  72  75  89
Korea  85  13  56  71  71  97
Malaysia  73  14  57  71  48  80
Thailand  103  26  56  69  68  94
Indonesia  139  66  41  60  39  84
/a  Per 1,000 live birth.
Source:  WDR and World Tables (various  issues).9.  The initial  regression  was run  with its  full  specification (see  Box 2)
The coefficients of inflation  and interest  rate  variables came out insignificant
and  the  inflation  variable had  the wrong  sign.  The  results  are not  very
surprising.  As noted, the empirical evidence cited in the literature regarding
the  relationship  between  inflation,  real  interest  rate  and  growth  is
inconclusive.  Moreover, it has also been argued that the relationship between
growth and inflation may be positive up to a certain rate of inflation and then
turn negative for higher rates of inflation [see  Dorrance  (1966)  and Thirlwall
(1978)]. Indeed,  dropping these  variables considerably improved the explanatory
power of the regression.  Share of government expenditure on human capital came
up with the wrong sign and was statistically insignificant.  This possibly is a
poor proxy for measuring the effect of human capital on Sri Lankan per capita
growth.  Alternatively, since the investment rate is supposed to pick up the
effects of spending on both physical and human capital, the separate influence
of public spending on human capital did not show up.  This variable was also
dropped.  Results of the final regression are shown in Table 4.
Box 2:  Determinants of Per Capita Growth--Model specification
The  basic  model  expresses the growth of  per  capita GDP  (GPGDP) as a
function  of  the  fixed  investment  rate  (INVR), share  of  government
consumption  (GOVCON), public  expenditure on human capital  (PEHK), the
inflation rate  (INV), the real interest rate  (RINT)  the black market
exchange premium  (BLPREM)  and the growth of exports (GEXP).  Thus,
GDGP=F(INVR, GCON, PEHK, INF, RINT, BLPREM, GEXP)  ............. (1)
Linearizing:
GDGP=  ao  +  a,  INVR +  a2 GCON  +  a3 PEHK  +  a4 INF  +  a5  RINT  +  a6 BLPREM
+a 7 GEXP  .................  (2)
The expected signs of the coefficients are:
a1>0; a2<0; a3>0; a4<0; a5>0;  a6<0;  a 7>0
10.  The statistical findings  reported in  Table 4 show that the coefficient
of the black-market premium is significant at the 95% level.  The coefficient of
the share of government consumption in GDP is also significant at the 95% level.
The coefficient of the investment rate is significant at the 90% level.  Also,
the  civil  conflict  adverse  effect  dummy  is  significant  at  the  90%  level.
However, the coefficient  of the growth  rate  of exports is  only significant at the
82  % level.  Overall, the regression  performs reasonably well and explains about
43% of the variance in Sri Lanka's per capita growth.  More importantly, the
economic interpretation of the results are very meaningful.-6-
Table 4:  Sri Lanka:  Determinants of Per Capita Economic Growth--
Regression Results (1970-92)
Variable  Constant  INVR  GCON  BLPREM  GEXP  INVDUM
Coefficient value  2.824  0.120  -0.198  -0.015  0.026  -0.051
t-ratios  (1.35)  (1.71)  (-1.73)  (-1.96)  (1.25)  (-1.79)
Adjusted R 2
=  0.43  D.W. =  1.81  F =  4.37
Note:  INVDUM =  Slope dummy for the INVR with 1983-88 period taking a value of
1, and 0 otherwise.
11.  The  main  implications  of  this  statistical  investigation  can  be
summarized as follows:
o  Consistent with the  findings  of the  cross-country  regression analysis,
per capita GDP growth in Sri Lanka is significantly related to the
investment rate.  Causality test  (Granger Causality test) confirms
that the causality is from investment rate to per capita growth and
not the other way round.
O  Surprisingly, however, the significance of the coefficient is at the
90t level and  not higher.  This can be explained  by the relatively low
productivity  of  the  investment  effort.  Indeed,  total  factor
productivity estimates show  that  Sri  Lanka experienced  negative factor
productivity over a substantial part of the 1970-92 period.
O  As expected, the civil conflict reduced the efficiency of investment.
O  There  is  significant  evidence  that  larger  government  consumption
adversely  affected  growth  in  Sri  Lanka.  This  is  consistent  with
Barro's  findings from cross-country analysis  [Barro  (1991)]  . The
result is quite appealing because the share of public consumption has
been going up in Sri Lanka, with a large part being diverted to non-
productive uses.  Much of the revenues raised to finance government
consumption  has relied on instruments  with relatively high efficiency
costs--international trade and domestic sales taxes.
o  The  highly  significant negative  coefficient  for  the  black  market
premium variable suggests  the  negative role  played by foreign exchange
controls in Sri Lanka.  More broadly interpreted, this variable  is
also a proxy measure for macroeconomic instability.  The significant
negative correlation with growth is consistent with the findings of
the  East Asian  Miracle Study  which shows that  the high-performing East
Asian economies had a relatively stable macroeconomic environment.
o  There is some support for the  positive role of export performance for
growth.  However, the low statistical significance of the coefficient
casts doubt on the reliability of the relationship.  This probably
reflects  the  fact  that  trade  liberalization  policies  have  been
implemented seriously only after 1977 and, moreover, a substantial
unfinished agenda remains.IV.  POLICY  DETERMINANTS  OF  SRI LANKA'S  GROWTH--A  DISAGGREGATED  APPROACH
12.  In the previous  section we  looked at  the statistical relationship
between Sri Lanka's growth performance, its investment rate and proxies for a
number of policy variables.  In addition to the positive impact of investment
rate  on growth, we found  supportive evidence for  the  role of fiscal  policy (share
of government consumption in  GDP),  and overall  macroeconomic management (proxied
by the foreign exchange black market premium).  These results are intuitively
appealing  and provide  useful guidance  to policy.  However,  the constraints
imposed by data in terms of quality and quantity, including finding the right
proxy, limit  the  possibility  of  probing econometrically  the role  of  various other
policies in  explaining  growth in  the  context  of an  aggregative time series  model.
So, below a more disaggregated and somewhat heuristic approach to the policy
determinants of economic  growth is  used to  better inform the policy debate.  The
experience of the East Asian economies is  particularly relevant in this regard.
The East Asia Paradigm
13.  Between 1965  and 1990 average real  per capita  GNP in the East Asia and
Pacific Region expanded by 5.3 e  per annum, highest for any region including
high-income economies, and much higher than the world average  (1.5%).  Most of
this  exemplary growth performance  is explained by  the performance  of  eight
countries--Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia,
Hongkong,  Thailand  and  Indonesia.  Many  studies  have  been  undertaken  to
understand  better  the determinants  of economic performance  in these dynamic
economies and the relevant lessons for  other countries.  In  particular, a recent
study by the World Bank--The East Asian Miracle--has probed quite deeply the
factors explaining growth in these economies and the implications for  policies.
The study identifies the following common characteristics shared by these fast
growing economies:
o  Overall high rates of productivity growth;
o  More rapid output and productivity growth in agriculture;
o  Higher rates of growth of manufactured exports;
o  Higher growth rates of physical capital, supported by higher rates of
domestic savings;
o  Higher initial levels and growth rates of human capital;
o  Earlier and steeper decline in fertility; and
o  Declining income inequality and reduced poverty.
14.  To what extent Sri  Lanka shared  these features?  Let us start with the
favorable ones.  As noted earlier, Sri Lanka stands out as a country with very
impressive  human development indicators.  This is both a reflection of favorable
initial human capital  endowment as well  as sustained progress  based  on  Sri
Lanka's firm commitment to human development (see  Box 3).  Similarly, Sri Lanka
has done very well in  population management.  The total fertility rate has been
declining steadily from 4.3 in 1970 to 2.5 in 1992.  The 1992 rate is close to
the East Asia and Pacific average of 2.3. Its current population growth rate of
1.1% per annum compares favorably with the 1.2% for the East Asia and Pacific
region.-8-
Box 3.  Exolainina Sri Lanka's Proaress with Human Development.
: :  x~~~n±tial  Condittons or Poti1cies?;
The issue of the role of initial conditions  versus the impact of policies
and  programs for  human development in  explaining Sri Lanka's  exceptionally
good performance in this area has.  been intensely  debated.  Isenman (1980)
and Sen  (1981;  1988) have attributed Sri Lanka's:  exceptional performance
to Sri Lanka's commitment backed.by aggressive social welfare programs.
On the other hand, Bhalla and Glewee (198:6)  and Bhalla (1988)  have argued
:that  much of Sri Lanka's good human development performance is explained
tby  the fact that Sri Lanka started out with good human endowment as early
as since its independence and certainly since 1960. If one allows for this
factor, the outlier nature of Sri Lanka's performance and the role of
policies  such  as  the  very  generous  social  welfare  programs  become
questionable.  In  a  rejoinder,  Isenman  (1987) has  shown  that  his
conclusions regarding Sri Lanka'ls  exceptionally good performance and the
strong  positive role  of social welfare  programs remain valid even allowing
for initial conditions.  As well, in a more recent study Isenman et.al.
(1994)  reach a similar conclusion.
15.  Regarding progress with reducing income inequality and poverty, the
performance is  somewhat mixed.  Although income inequality  and poverty have both
been reduced over the past thirty  years (see  Table 5),  with a more rapid pace of
GDP growth the pace of  progress in reducing poverty could have  been much better.
A major  social problem  in Sri Lanka has been  the rather high  rate of  open
unemployment.  A further  problem is the low-income  employment in rural and urban
informal sectors.  This is partly the result of relatively low GDP growth, but
also reflects policy-induced distortions in  the labor  market and the low quality
of education and training.
Table 5:  Trend in Poverty and Income Inequality in Sri Lanka
1960  1970  1980  1992
A.  Social Indicators
- Life expectancy at birth (yrs.)  63.0  64.7  68.1  72.0
- Infant mortality rate /a  71.0  53.2  34.4  19.3
- Adult  literacy  rate  '^  75.0  82.4  85.0  89.0
- Primary  school  enrollment  "  95.0  99.0  100.0  108.0 /d
- Secondary School enrollment '-  27.0  47.0  51.0  74.0 '/
1963  1982  1985-86  1990-91
B.  Consumption Poverty
- Head count index (%)  37.0  27.0  27.3  22.4
C.  Measure of Inecrualitv
- Gini coefficient  (%)  32.04  29.66
Source:
1.  Social indicators are from WDR  (various  issues) and World Tables  (various
issues).
2.  Estimates of consumption  poverty for 1985-86 and 1990-91  are from the World
Bank's Sri Lanka Poverty Report  (1994).  The 1963-82 estimates refer to
income poverty  and are obtained from the 1990 WDR.  Note  that  the two
sources of poverty estimates are not comparable.
3.  Gini coefficient estimates for 1985-86 and 1990-91 are from World Bank's
Sri Lanka Poverty Report  (1994).  They refer to consumption distribution
rather than income.- 9  -
16.  The  comparison  is  not  very  favorable  in  terms  of  the  other
characteristics  of  the East Asian high  flyers.  Let us  start  with  capital
formation.  On average Sri Lanka invested about 20t of its GDP over the past 32
years  (see  Table 6).  The average investment rate in the high-performing East
Asian  economies  exceed  this  rate--Korea(26.5%),  Malaysia(23.7%),  Thailand (24.6t)
and Indonesia  (21%).  More importantly, the efficiency of investment was much
lower in Sri Lanka  (see Table 7).  Thus, the average return on capital in Sri
Lanka was about  21% as compared with 33% in Korea,  31% in Thailand,  27% in
Malaysia and 26% in Indonesia.  Estimates of total factor productivity show that
the  contribution of TFP improvement  to  growth has  generally  been very small, with
a long period of negative contribution (see  Table 8).
17.  Another major weakness in Sri Lanka has been the low domestic saving
rate.  The average saving rate of about 13% of GDP in Sri Lanka compares quite
poorly with saving rates of over 30% in Malaysia, 25% in Korea, 24W in Thailand
and 25% in Indonesia.  Although the net  inflows of unrequited factor income
(basically  worker  remittances),  boosted the  national  saving  performance somewhat,
the gap  between saving and investment  remains significantly large (see  Graph 1)
Table  6:  Savings,  Investment  in Sri Lanka  and  Comparators
(Average  p.a., % of GDP)
1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-92  1961-92
GDI  GDS  GDI  GDS  GDI  GDS  GDI  GDS  GDI  GDS  GDI  GDS  GDI  GDS
Sri  Lanka  14.5  NA  15.4  9.7  16.5  13.5  18.4  13.8  29.4  13.7  23.0  12.8  19.9  12.8
Korea  13.9  NA  22.9  13.6  25.9  17.6  30.0  25.4  29.7  26.6  32.9  35.8  26.5  25.1
Malaysia  15.1  NA  15.6 24.2  23.1  26.9  25.5  32.5  34.8  31.6  27.3  33.9  23.7  30.5
Thailand  18.2  NA  23.8  21.8  24.9  22.6  26.6  21.9  25.3  20.2  27.8  29.6  24.6  24.0
Indonesia  12.1  NA  8.0  3.7  16.6 20.8  20.5 28.1  26.7  31.5  28.3 33.5  20.4 25.0
Source:  WorLd  Tables;  IFS  (various  years)
Table  7:  Average  Rate  of Return  on Investment  in Sri  Lanka  and  Comparators
(%  p.a.)
GDP  Growth  Rate  Average  Investment  Rate  Average  Rate  of  Return
1960-70  1970-80  1980-90  1960-70  1970-80  1980-90  1960-70  1970-80  1980-90
East  Asia &  Pacific  --  6.6  7.8  --  28.4  30.5  --  23.2  25.6
Korea  8.6  9.1  9.7  19.0  28.0  30.6  45.3  32.5  31.7
MaLaysia  6.5  7.8  6.0  15.8  26.3  30.8  41.1  29.7  19.5
Thailand  8.4  7.2  7.6  22.7  25.9  26.8  37.0  27.8  28.4
Indonesia  3.9  7.8  5.5  10.2  22.6  23.9  '  38.0  34.5  23.0
Sri  Lanka  4.7  4.0  4.3  15.1  17.5  25.4  31.1  22.9  16.7
/a Fixed  investment  only.
Data  Sources:  1993  World  Table;  1986  IFS  Yearbook  and  1994  WDR.- 10  -
Table 8:  Sri Lanka Contribution of Total Factor ProductivitY to Growth
(% p.a.)
1960-70  1971-77  1978-82  1983-89  1990-92  1960-92
Contribution of
Capital  2.10  1.76  4.62  2.52  1.94  2.48
Labor  1.19  1.28  1.82  1.38  2.16  1.44
TFP change  1.41  -0.13  -0.21  -0.69  0.93  0.42
GDP growth  4.70  2.91  6.23  3.21  5.03  4.34
Note: The  weights  of Labor and Capital  are derived  from a Cobb-Douglas  production  function  widt constant  retums to scale. The  weights  are:
labor 0.6 and capital  0.4.  Capital  stock is esimated from investnent  data  using the  perpetaal  inventoty  method. Employment  data is obtained
from Korale  (1990)  and the  1990  Labor Force Survey. Missing  data are interpolated.
18.  A third negative factor has been the weak growth performance of the
agriculture sector (see  Table 9)  . Partly  because  of this, the sector's  GDP share
has been declining quite noticeably.  On the other hand, the dependence of Sri
Lanka's population on  agriculture for  employment and income  remains substantial.
Therefore, continued high rural poverty and low-income rural employment  are
directly related to the weak growth outturn in agriculture.
Table 9:  Comparative Aaricultural Growth Performance
(% p.a.  in real  terms)
1970-80  1980-92
Sri Lanka  2.8  2.1
Korea  2.7  1.9
Indonesia  4.1  3.1
Malaysia  4.7  3.6
Thailand  4.4  4.1
Source:  WDR 1994.
19.  Finally, overall export growth over the past thirty years has been
rather poor.  Thus, the volume of  exports has expanded  at an average rate of only
1.6%  between 1960  and 1992.  In  contrast, exports expanded by 20% p.a. in Korea,
11% p.a. in Thailand and 10% p.a. in Indonesia.  Although manufactured export
performance  has  improved  substantially  following  trade  and  other  economic
liberalization policies instituted since 1977, the export base remains fragile
and narrowly concentrated on a small number of commodities.  Not surprisingly,
the GDP share of the manufacturing sector still remains below 20% as compared
with 28% in Thailand, 26% in Korea, 30% in Malaysia and 21% in Indonesia.
Explaining Sri Lanka's Low Growth
20.  What factors explain Sri Lanka's low productivity of investment, low
domestic  saving,  low-income  employment,  weak  agriculture  performance,  low
flexibility of labor market, weak skills and poor overall export performance?
As indicated  by the r3sults of the aggregative  models, a search for answers must- 11  -
lie in the  underlying policy environment.  We would discuss the  policy framework
under the following grouping--macroeconomic management, trade and industrial
sector policies,  financial sector policies, agriculture sector policies,  and
policies for improving the flexibility  of the labor  markets and quality of human
capital.
21.  Macroeconomic  management:  The  adverse  effects  of  inappropriate
macroeconomic  management  for productivity  and growth  were  indicated  by  the
regression results in terms of the negative coefficients of the GDP share of
government  consumption  and  the  black  market  premium  variables.  Indeed,
maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment  has been the  Achilles Heel of Sri
Lanka's  economic  management  throughout  the  period.  Fiscal  deficits  have
generally been high for  the entire  period (see  Graph 2).  The balance of  payments
deficits were relatively low  up to the late 1970s, but have expanded since 1979.
To a large extent, these deficits in the balance of payments and fiscal account
reflect the surge in concessional foreign aid since the late 1970s.  Indeed, the
rapid growth in these deficits in the 1978-83  period largely reflect the flow of
foreign assistance to finance the expansion of the huge multi-purpose Mahaweli
scheme.  Nevertheless,  large  fiscal  and  balance  of  payments  deficits,
particularly fiscal deficits, have contributed to a rapid a growth in domestic
and international indebtedness  and a relatively  high rate  of inflation (see  Table
10).  The growth  in international debt did not create any  significant debt
servicing problem partly because of the high concessionality of the debt flows.
Large fiscal deficits, however, have emerged as a major source of concern.  It
has not only contributed to  high inflation, domestic debt servicing obligations
of the Treasury has generated some elements of dynamic instability.  Thus, in
1992, debt service obligations  (mostly  of domestic origin) ate up almost 6% of
GDP or a third of total tax revenues.
22.  From  a  policy point of  view, the  main difficulty has  been the inability
to address the fiscal problem.  A related issue is the role of external aid and
its implications for domestic saving and real exchange rate management.
23.  Fiscal  Policy:  Fiscal difficulties primarily  reflect problems  in
managing government spending.  Sri Lanka  has made steady  progress in raising tax
revenues.  Although  there are problems  of efficiency and  equity in the  tax
structure, at about 20% of GDP, Sri Lanka's tax effort compares well with other
developing  countries at similar income levels.  Efforts to mobilize  non-tax
revenues, however, have been limited by weak cost recovery policies for public
services.  So, total revenues  have  been about  21% of  GDP.  Regarding expenditure,
despite recent attempts to  control spending,  government spending is still around
28-30% of  GDP.  As  a result, fiscal deficits are still  in the 7-9% range.
Although the Government reduced the fiscal deficit substantially over the past
decade or so--from 17% of GDP in 1980 to 7% in 1993--using both expenditure and
revenue  measures, government spending  and  deficits  still  remain  higher than  their
sustainable levels.  The unsustainability of the fiscal deficits is indicated  by
the continued deficit in the  primary budget balance (see  Graph 3) and the rising
interest cost of the budget (see  Graph 4)'.
A recent  paper by Stern (1993)  provides a quantitative analysis of Sri
Lanka's fiscal unsustainability problem.  However, unlike this paper,
Stern argues strongly for a substantial increase in the tax revenue
effort.- 12  -
Graph 1: Sri Lanka  Saving,  Investment  Balance  Graph 2: Sri Lanka  Trend in Current  Account
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Graph 3: Primary  Budget  Balance  Graph 4: Sri Lanka  Govemment  Expenditure  on
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Table  10:  Macrobalances  in Sri  Lanka  and  Comparators
(Average,  % p.a.)
1960-70  1970-80  1980-91  1960-91
A.  Inflation  (CPI)
- Sri Lanka  2.9  8.7  12.2  7.9
- Korea  13.8  16.2  6.6  12.2
- Malaysia  1.0  5.9  4.2  3.7
- Thailand  2.3  9.7  4.5  5.5
- Indonesia  --  17.6  9.5  12.5  ^
B.  Fiscal  Deficit  (% of GDP
- Sri  Lanka  -6.36  -8.38  -10.81  -8.34
- Korea  -0.50  -1.63  -1.05  -1.03
- Malaysia  -3.88  -6.41  -6.22  -5.75
- Thailand  -1.19  -3.13  -2.33  -2.20
- Indonesia  --  -2.60  -1.55  -2.10'
C.  Current  Deficit  (% of GDP)'/
- Sri  Lanka  -2.69  -3.22  -6.97  -4.05
- Korea  -3.03  -5.39  0.40  -2.56
- Malaysia  0.18  0.41  -3.00  -1.19
- Thailand  -1.32  -3.30  -4.40  -2.98
- Indonesia  --  -1.24  -2.55  -1.89't
D.  External  Debt  to GDP  (%)'c
- Sri  Lanka  21.6  45.8  72.3
- Korea  38.9  47.0  16.2
- Malaysia  17.8  27.0  37.7
- Thailand  15.0  20.7  36.5
- Indonesia  41.4  18.1  43.6
E.  External  Debt  to Export  (%)'E
- Sri  Lanka  150.1  137.4  251.3
- Korea  186.1  130.6  47.1
- Malaysia  50.1  44.4  44.9
- Thailand  77.3  96.7  94.9
- Indonesia  220.2  94.2  231.2
/a  Current  account  deficit  defined  as excluding  official  transfers.
/b  Average  over  the  1970-91  period.
/c  End  of period.
/d  For  1972.
Source:  IFS and  World  Tables  (various  years).
24.  A yet  another  problem  associated  with  large  fiscal  deficits  has  been
the  prevalence  of relatively  high  inflation  (see Graph  5).  This  has  happened
despite  frequent  government  interventions  to  moderate  price  increases  of
sensitive  commodities.  Fiscal  deficits  have  fueled  inflation  by contributing  to
excess  demand,  working  through  the  impact  on  money  supply.  The  results  of- 14  -
regression analysis of the determinants of inflation are shown in Table  11.2
Domestic variables--the stock  of real  money and real income--both have the right
sign.  The stock of beginning period real money is statistically significant at
the 95% level  indicating the role  of  excess  money supply in  explaining inflation.
However, the income  variable is  not significant  suggesting that Sri  Lanka  may not
have benefitted from the  dampening effect of income  due  to the relatively low and
somewhat volatile  pace of economic  growth.  On the  external side,  world inflation
is a significant determinant of Sri Lanka.  inflation.  Surprisingly, however,
changes  in nominal  exchange  rate  failed  to show  any  significant  effect  on
inflation  . 3
Table 11:  Sri Lanka:  Determinants of Inflation--Regression Results  (1970-92)
Variable  Constant  LRM2(-l)  LRGDP  WINF  CNEXR
Coefficient value  0.851  0.154  -0.144  0.0065  0.003
t - statistics  (0.83)  (2.27)  (-1.10)  (3.28)  (0.45)
Adjusted R 2 =  0.51  D.W. = 2.1  F-statistic =  6.69
Notes:  LRM2(-l) =  Log of real money lagged one period.
LRGDP  =  Log  of  real  GDP.
WINF  =  World inflation rate.
CNEXR  =  Rate of change of nominal exchange rate  (depreciation  of
the exchange rate).
25.  It can be argued that large fiscal and current account deficits are
partly  a  reflection of  the relatively large availability of  foreign aid  at
concessional terms.  The pattern of aid to GDP ratio is shown in Graph 6.  On
average, Sri Lanka has mobilized about 4% of GDP as foreign aid at a very low
average  interest  rate  (2% in  nominal  terms  as  per  annum  of  1992)  . Not
surprisingly, despite rising external debt to GDP ratio, debt service ratio has
continued to decline, partly due to the highly concessional nature of aid.  As
is  well known,  however, large inflow  of foreign  aid is  not  necessarily an unmixed
blessing.  Much  depends upon  the efficiency of use  of  foreign aid and  the
protection of the  domestic economy  from its  potential adverse effects  on  national
saving and the exchange rate management.  What has been the effect of this large
aid inflow on saving and exchange rate in Sri Lanka?
26.  Effect of foreign aid on private saving:  Empirical analysis of the
saving function is shown in  Table 12.  Using private national saving rate as the
dependent  variable, the regressors  included  growth  of  GDP,  population growth rate
(to  represent the  role  of demographic  factors)  ,  a  variable representing financial
depth  (deposit to GDP ratio) and the current account balance  (to capture the
impact of foreign saving).  A dummy variable to capture the effect of the civil
2  The  theoretical  rationale  underlying  the  inflation  equation
specification is that inflation is determined by imported inflation
(world  inflation  and exchange rate  changes) and domestic excess supply
of  money  (determined by  the  gap  between  desired  and  actual  real
balances).  See for example, Cyrus and Otani (1986).
3  The results are generally consistent with those reported by Heytens
(1994).  One  difference,  however,  is  that  Heytens  reported  a
significant coefficient for the income variable.- 15  -
war on external  private  capital  flows  is also  added.  All  coefficients  have  the
right  sign.  The  coefficients  of  financial  depth  and  the  civil  war  dummy  are
significant  at  the  951  level.  The  coefficient  of  current  account  balance  is
significant  at  the  90W  level.  However,  the  coefficients  of GDP  and  population
growth  variables  are significant  at only  the 80% level.  The results  suggest  that
Sri Lanka  could  accelerate  its saving  rate by strengthening  its financial  sector
and  by  ending  the  civil  conflict.  The  surprisingly  low  significance  of  the
growth  rate  probably  reflects  the  uncertainties  in economic  prospects  that  has
prevailed  in Sri  Lanka  for a  fairly  long  period.  It is arguable  that  a higher
sustained  GDP  growth  will  help  raise  the  saving  rate  in  the  future.  The
significant  negative  relationship  between  foreign  saving  and  private  national
saving  suggests  that  there  is some  empirical  evidence  of a  crowding  out  effect
of  foreign  saving  on domestic  saving.
Table  12:  Sri  Lanka:  Determinants  of  the Private  Savings  Rate-
Regression  Results  (1970-92)
Variable  Constant  GGDP  GPOP  FINDEP  CURBAL  WARDUMMY
Coefficient  value  6.50  0.319  -1.826  0.446  -0.199  -2.591
t  - statistics  (1.50)  (1.35)  (-1.35)  (3.21)  (-1.87)  (-2.65)
Adjusted  R 2 =  0.45  D.W.  =  2.38  F =  4.58
Notes:  GGDP  =  GDP  growth  rate.
GPOP  =  Population  growth  rate.
FINDEP  =  Measure  of financial  depth  (Dep/GDP).
CURBAL  =  Current  account  balance--foreign  savings  rate.
WARDUMMY  =  Dummy  to account  for  the  effect  of the  civil  war.
27.  Effect  of  foreign  on  the  real  exchange  rate:  The  movement  in  real
exchange  rate  is illustrated  in Graph  7.  The  real  exchange  rate  is defined  as
rupees  per  unit  of US dollar  and adjusted  for relative  movements  in US wholesale
and  Sri  Lanka  consumer  prices.
4 So,  an  upward  movement  indicates  real
depreciation.  The real  exchange  rate  was roughly  flat  in the  1963-73  period  and
then  showed  a trend  toward  depreciation.  The  RER  depreciated  sharply  in  1978,
following  the  large  devaluation  of November  1977  by  76t.  After  this  one  time
realignment,  the RER has  fluctuated  mildly  around  a constant  trend with  a slight
tendency  towards  appreciation.  What  factors  explain  the  behavior  of the  RER?
To answer  this  question  empirically,  the real exchange  rate was  regressed  on the
terms  of  trade  (TOT),  total  government  expenditure  as a  share  of GDP  (GEGDP),
total  capital  flows  (FCAP) and the share  of total bank  deposits  to GDP  (DEPGDP).
The first  three variables  are standard  determinants  of the RER  (see, for example,
Edwards  (1987) for  justification)  . As indicated  earlier,  the variable  deposits
as a percentage  of GDP  is a proxy  for measuring  financial  depth.  The  rationale
for  introducing  this  as  a determinant  of  the  RER  is  that  financial  deepening
helps  sustain  real  depreciation  by  containing  aggregate  demand  and  diverting
household  demand  from  non-tradeable  assets  to financial  assets  (See Athukorala
and  Rajapatirana  (1993))
28.  The  results  of  the  regression,  expressed  in  logarithmic  form  and
corrected  for  first-order  autocorrelation,  are shown  in Table  13.  The  terms  of
trade variable  turned  out insignificant  and was dropped.  The net  capital  flows,
4  For a justification  of this definition  of the RER,  see Harberger  (1988)- 16 -
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total government spending and financial depth variables all came up with the
right sign and highly significant coefficient.  Thus, while financial deepening
has supported Sri Lanka's efforts to achieve a real depreciation, large capital
inflows, especially official aid inflows, and associated large public spending
have  worked  against  this.  Similar  results  are  reported  by  Athukoral  and
Rajapatirana  (1993) and  White  and Wignaraja  (1992)  . These  findings  raise
important concerns about the consistency of macroeconomic policy management in
Sri Lanka.
Table 13:  Effects of Aid Flows on Real Exchange Rate in Sri Lanka--
Regression Results (1970-92)
Variable  Constant  LFCAP(-1)  LDEPGDP  LGEGDP(-l)
Coefficient value  4.19  -0.293  0.807  -0.069
t-statistics  (4.95)  (-3.23)  (3.27)  (-1.84)
Adjusted R 2
=  0.95  DW-statistics =  2.06  F-statistics =  86.92
29.  Trade and Industrial  Policies 5. Despite frequent changes in the trade
and industrial policy regime, it is possible to broadly classify Sri Lanka's
trade and  industrial  strategy in two  distinct phases:  a  relatively  inward-
oriented, public  investment led phase  (1960-77) and a more outward-oriented
private  investment led period  (1978-92)  . Not withstanding a brief phase of
partial liberalization in 1965-69, Sri Lanka's trade and industrial  policies in
the  1960-77  period  were  generally  geared  towards  the  promotion  of  import
substitution industrialization supported by public investment.  Overall, the
policy bias against exports was fairly prominent and the role of nationalized
state enterprises was dominant.  The main features of the trade and industrial
policy regime were:
o  licensing of industrial investment;
o  intervention in labor markets;
o  wide-ranging fiscal incentives to industries;
o  nationalization  of  private  enterprises,  setting  up  of  public
manufacturing enterprises;
o  exchange control regulations and a dual exchange rate system since
1965;
o  highly differentiated tariff structure ranging from 10% to 300%;
o  trade controls on both exports and imports; and
5  The pattern of Sri Lanka's trade and industrialization policies and
its impact on economic performance has been studied in varying depths
by a number of authors.  See for example Rajapatirana  (1988), Yapa
(1988)  and  Wickramsinghe (1992)  . The conclusions of these studies are
generally consistent with the findings reported here.- 18  -
a  domestic price controls.
30.  Apart from  discouraging private investment  in  general, the  main effect
of these policies was to impart a significant anti-export bias.  This was done
both through an overvaluation of the real exchange rate  as well as through large
import protection--quantitative restrictions as well as tariff barriers.  The
resultant excess demand for foreign  exchange was reflected in large  premiums in
the  black market (see  Graph 8)  . What  was the impact  of these  policies on exports
and the manufacturing sector performance?  Table 14 shows the growth of total
exports and value added in manufacturing.  The manufacturing sector performed
reasonably  well during 1960-70,  but the  performance  weakened substantially in  the
1970-77  period.  Thus, value added in  manufacturing during 1970-77 grew by only
1% per annum, slower than growth of total GDP which also decelerated.  As a
result, the share of manufacturing in GDP declined from 16.7% in 1970 to 14.7%
in 1977.  Overall  (1960-77),  manufacturing value added expanded at around the
same pace as total GDP (4%  p.a.) during this import substitution phase causing
the share of manufacturing to remain unchanged at around 15%.  The performance
of exports was very poor, growing by only 1.5% in 1960-70 and then moving to a
declining phase  during 1970-77.  Perhaps  the  most important  factor  underlying the
poor export performance in this phase was the rapid decline in the performance
of the tea sector  partly due to depressed  world demand for tea but mainly due to
nationalization.  There was some attempt to boost manufactured exports through
(i) the  launching of  the Foreign  Exchange Entitlement  Scheme  (FEES) and  a
devaluation in 1967; (ii) allowing non-traditional exporters to retain 25% of
their earnings;  and (iii)  establishing  a export  promotion  Secretariat and  a State
Gem Corporation.  The initial response to these incentives was very positive.
The value of manufactured exports grew from less than US$5 million in 1970 to
around US$90 million in 1977.  Although the growth rate of manufactured exports
was impressive, the small manufacturing base failed to make any notable impact
either on the overall export performance or on manufacturing value-added.  More
importantly,  the reduction in  the  overvaluation  of the real  exchange rate  was not
supported by trade and industrial deregulation reforms.
Table  14:  Sri  Lanka:  Performance  of Manufacturing  Value-Added  and
Total  Exports  - 1960-92
(% p.a.)
Inward-Orientation Phase  Outward-Orientation Phase
1960-70  1970-77  1960-77  1977-89  1989-92  1977-92
Growth of
manufacturing
value added  6.2  1.0  4.0  5.4  8.3  6.0
Share of
manufacturing
in GDP  '/  16.7  14.7  --  16.8  18.5  --
Growth of




total  exports  La  2.2  11.4  --  54.7  64.4  --
/a  End of period; value added share in constant rupees terms;
export share in current dollar terms.
Source:  Central Bank of Sri Lanka, World Tables.- 19  -
Graph 7:  Sri Lanka  Movement  in real  exchange  rate
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31.  The 1977-92  period witnessed  a general  move toward  outward orientation
and encouragement of private investment, despite the stop-go nature of reforms.
The  reforms  were  implemented  in  two  phases:  1977-82  and  1989-92,  with  a
relatively inactive period in between.  The main characteristics of trade and
industrial policies for the period as a whole were:
o  encouragement  of  private  domestic  and  foreign  investment  through
substantial deregulation of investment licensing;
o  significant  reduction  in  quantitative  restrictions  and  tariff
barriers--the maximum nominal tariff has been successively reduced to
about 50% in 1992;
o  unification of the exchange rate along with substantial downward
adjustment in November 1977 to correct for the overvaluation of the
exchange rate and adoption of a  policy of more flexible exchange rate
management  (crawling  peg) since 1983;
o  substantial liberalization of the exchange and payments system.
32.  These policies substantially reduced the anti-export bias and boosted
private  and  foreign investment.  As a result, not withstanding  the  adverse
effects of the civil war since 1983, the  performance of the manufacturing sector
improved noticeably (Table  14).  Thus,  manufactured value added expanded by 5.4%
in 1978-89 and 8.3% in 1989-92.  The stronger growth performance  in 1989-92
reflects the effect of the renewed reform  efforts that followed the policy slack
during most of the 1980s.  A similar pattern is reflected in the response of
exports. In both, manufactured exports played a lead role.  As a result, its
share in total exports expanded from only 11% in 1977 to 55% in 1989 and to 64%
in 1992.  Also, deregulation of  the exchange  and  payment system along with better
availability of foreign exchange substantially  reduced  the black  market exchange
rate premium  (see  Graph 8).
33.  The proper management of the exchange rate and its implications for
exports has been a subject of debate in Sri Lanka.  Despite improvements in
exchange  rate management,  earlier we presented evidence  supporting the aid-
induced Dutch disease hypothesis.  As well, we pointed out that similar results
have been reported by a number of other studies.  Yet, we have also observed a
strong pick up in exports in the 1978-92 period.  How does one reconcile these
apparent contradictory outcomes?  Graph 9 plots the movement in export volume
and the real exchange rate. Exports were roughly  flat  during the 1970-77  period,
even though the RER  depreciated somewhat  for  the period as  a whole.  Exports then
took off since 1978.  The growth of exports has been particularly rapid since
1989.  The RER did depreciate rapidly in 1978 but has shown a mild tendency
toward appreciation since then.  Peculiarly, exports and RER seem to move in
opposite direction.  What factors  then  explain the  rapid growth of  exports in  the
1980s?
34.  The determinants of exports are shown in Table 15.  The volume of
exports was regressed on the real exchange rate (RER),  world income (WINCOM)  and
a  domestic  supply  side variable--deviation  of GDP  from trend  (QT)  .6  The
regression is  run in logarithmic  form.  World income  and  domestic supply  are both
significant determinant of  Sri Lanka's exports.  The RER variable, however,
yields a perverse result showing up with a significant negative coefficient.
This peculiar result can be rationalized as follows.  In the 1970s the overall
environment  for  exports  was  depressed  by  weak  and  inward-looking  domestic
policies, reflected in below trend GDP growth, and relatively sluggish world
demand for Sri Lanka's exports.  The environment for exports improved noticeably
6  See Bond (1987)  for theoretical justification for this reduced form.- 21  -
after 1977,  starting with a substantial real depreciation in November 1977, a
pick up in world demand for Sri Lanka's exports, and more supportive domestic
policies in terms  of  trade and financial  sector liberalization  which is  reflected
in above trend expansion in domestic output in the 1978-82 and 1990-92 periods.
So, exports gained momentum even though the RER has shown a tendency toward
appreciation.  Nevertheless, the appreciation of the RER remains a cause for
concern.  A continued tendency towards appreciation will sooner or later begin
to hurt exports.  A careful monitoring of the RER trend will be necessary to
ensure its consistency with export development.
Table 15:  Sri Lanka:  Relationship Between Exports and Real Exchange Rate
--Regression Results, 1970-92
Variable  Constant  LRER  LWINCOM  LQT
Coefficient value  -2.465  -0.321  1.641  -2.127
t-statistics  (-4.447)  (-5.616)  (11.646)  (4.137)
Adjusted R2
=  0.90  DW-statistics =  1.73  F-statistics =  64.19
Financial Sector Policies
35.  Before 1977, Sri Lanka followed  a policy of financial repression with
negative or very low real rates of interest.  Government intervention in the
allocation of credit and determination  of interest rates  was pervasive.  In 1961
the Bank of Ceylon, the only indigenous commercial bank, was nationalized.  As
well, the state-owned People's Bank was established to meet the financial needs
of the rural economy.  Under the Finance Act No. 65 of 1961, Sri Lankans were
prohibited  from  opening  new  accounts  in  foreign banks  or  increasing  their
deposits.  Also, foreign banks were prohibited from opening new branches.  In
1963, the Central Bank was empowered to provide long and medium-term finance to
institutions engaged in  the  provision of credit for  productive  purposes.  Credit
ceiling and selective credit controls  were used as instruments to channel credit
in line with the priorities of the Government's economic policy.  The dominance
of the two government-owned banks in the banking system  greatly facilitated the
implementation of these preferential credit policies.
36.  What has been the impact of financial  repression on growth?  As noted
in  Section III  above, international  evidence including  the evidence from  the  East
Asian economies is  mixed.  However,  while the  effects of  mild, periodic financial
repression  on growth is  ambiguous,  there is  adequate  evidence that  large  negative
interest rates cannot be sustained  and would eventually lead to reduced growth.
Furthermore,  the  inefficiencies  resulting  from  credit  rationing  and  weak
financial intermediation can be expected to have reduced growth.
37.  Since 1977,  Sri  Lanka  has  made some  progress in  reforming  the financial
sector.  Interest rate controls  have been eased, foreign  banks have been allowed
to set up branches and commercial banks are allowed to operate foreign currency
banking unit  (FCBU) to develop offshore banking facilities in Sri Lanka.  The
response to these  measures has  been positive.  In a recent study, Athukorala and
Rajapatirana  (1993)  conclude that the financial sector reforms since 1977 have
boosted private investment  by increasing  the  availability of financial resources
and have also helped to contain the  appreciation of the  RER by diverting demand
from  non-tradeables to  financial  assets. Nevertheless,  despite  greater financial- 22 -
deepening, deposit to  GDP ratio  and  private credit to  GDP still remain  much below
that in Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia (see  Table 16).  The gap between
average real  lending and borrowing rates is too  large, suggesting room  for
efficiency  improvement.  Nominal  and  real  lending  rates  have  also  become
needlessly  high  in  view  of  high  and  variable  inflation  and  resultant
uncertainties about price stability.  A part of the problem is the continued
dominance of the two state-owned banks in the financial sector, suggesting the
scope for further deregulation.  There are also serious efficiency problems in
these banks, which partly explain the large intermediation margins.  Finally,
interest rate management has been complicated by the recent surge in capital
inflows and the attempt to sterilize the monetary impact of these inflows.
Table  16:  Measures  of  Financial  Depth  in Sri  Lanka  and  Comparators  L!
1972  1980  1985  1990  1992
D  PC  D  PC  D  PC  D  PC  D  PC
Sri Lanka  17.7  13.9  25.2  25.4  24.4  24.0  21.3  19.6  24.2  22.2
Korea  30.2  35.1  28.1  42.3  33.5  53.7  35.9  59.0  37.9  58.9
Malaysia  39.7  21.1  40.2  38.3  53.9  61.7  57.1  72.2  --  --
Thailand  25.9  19.5  31.2  30.6  54.3  49.5  78.2  79.3  --  --
Indonesia  --  --  12.0  9.5  18.1  18.2  38.2  50.2  47.6  55.0
/a  D =  total bank deposits; PC =  private sector credit.
Source:  International Financial Statistics (IMF).
Agricultural  Sector  Policies
38.  An important reason for the relatively slower economic growth in Sri
Lanka is the  weak performance of the  agriculture sector. As noted earlier (Table
8) the average growth  rate of agriculture has been generally below  that  in
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia.  The  performance has been particularly weak in
the 1980s where this fell significantly short of even the South Asian regional
average  (2.11  p.a.)(3.41 p.a.).  Various factors contributed to the success of
agriculture in  the East  Asian economies,  notable  among them  being:  land  reforms,
agricultural extension and services, reasonably good infrastructure and heavy
investment in the rural areas.  As well, the low levels of direct and indirect
taxation on agriculture in East Asia played a crucial role.
39.  Why  has the  agriculture  sector's  performance  been  generally weak? And,
what explains  why agriculture's  overall  performance did  not improve in  the 1980s,
especially as other sectors seem to have done better after the deregulation
policies of the post 1977  period?  Let us start  with the first  question.  Bhalla
and Lahiri  (1986) have argued that  in general policies were  biased  against
agriculture.  Thus, as a result of pricing policies, resources were transferred
out of agriculture.  Within agriculture,  policies favored paddy production.
Indeed, achievement of rice self-sufficiency  seems to  have been a major national
objective without regards to its opportunity cost.  The attention to paddy has
meant  liberal  investment  in  irrigation  and making  this  water  available  at
virtually free of cost, fertilizer subsidies, subsidized farm loans for rice
farmers,  and  price and trade  controls that  have  reduced incentives for  other farm
outputs.  The  impact of these policies has been that while paddy production
expanded noticeably, yields began to decline as paddy farming moved into areas
that were not suitable for  growing rice.  Not surprisingly,  despite the emphasis
place on paddy,  the expansion of value added  from paddy has not  shown much
dynamism (see  Table 17)  . Overall, the  performance  of other crops  has been strong
in terms of growth  in value-added.  But this expansion has  come  from good- 23 -
response from a few inefficient crops that were heavily protected  (chillies,
onions, potatoes)  . The performance of other  more efficient and high value added
products  (fruits, flowers,  gherkins)  has  been  constrained  by  trade  policy
distortions and other constraints.
40.  Regarding tree crops, in the 1950s and the 1960s, they played a major
role in terms of supply of foreign exchange, value-added and employment.  The
performance of tree crops deteriorated severely in the 1970s, reflecting the
impact of nationalization and subsequent  mismanagement of large estates as well
as the worsening of the incentives [see  World Bank (1993)].  Nationalization of
the estates led to  big losses in  productivity because the Government had neither
the knowledge nor the experience to run plantations.  As well, the Government
levied heavy export duties on tree crops, and, starting in 1967, initiated a
system  of  dual  exchange  rate  applicable  to  the  traditional  export  crops.
Furthermore,  the  Government's  continuous  intervention  in  the  labor  market
increased wages and benefits  and drove up production  costs  for the estates
without any productivity increase.
Table 17:  Sri Lanka Agriculture Sector Composition and Performance
1960-70  1970-77  1977-92  1960-92
- Growth of Agriculture  (%  p.a.)
- Sectoral value-added  3.7  2.3  2.6  2.9
tree crops  N.A.  1.8  -0.1  N.A.
paddy  N.A.  0.1  2.2  N.A.
other crops  N.A.  6.4  4.2  N.A.
- Share  of  Sectoral  VA"
tree crops  35.1  26.5  23.5
rice  28.0  24.8  23.2
other crops  36.9  48.7  53.3
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
a/  End of period in constant prices.
41.  The answer to  the  second  question--a  seemingly  puzzle--lies in  that  the
liberalization policies in the post-1977 period did not attempt to address the
constraints in the agriculture sector. Although the overall  negative protection
of agriculture was reduced through lower trade taxes and a correction of the
exchange rate overvaluation, most of the serious distortions remained.  Thus,
trade and pricing policy interventions have continued to be pervasive.  Factor
market  distortions  in  regard  to  land  and  credit  markets  are  substantial,
particularly the absence of a well-functioning land market.  On top, support
services  such as  agriculture research and  extension are  inadequate and  the
efficiency of water use  is low.  As a result, yields are low, the cropping
pattern is inefficient and costs are high.
42.  The poor performance of  the publicly-owned plantations  has been  a
matter of concern for the  Government for  sometimes  but serious efforts to improve
the situation did not start until mid-1992.  Thus, in June 1992 the Government
reorganized the plantations into 22 public companies and contracted out their
management to private firms on a profit sharing  basis.  The contracts were given- 24  -
for  a  period  of  five  years  with  possibility  for  renewal  depending  upon
performance.  Export taxes on  plantations were  also eliminated.  Although these
reforms proved beneficial, they were not adequate.  Without ownership and given
the  short  duration  of  the  contracts,  the  incentives  for  private  equity
participation  in  the  state-owned plantations  remain weak.  Also  continued
Government intervention in wage setting and employment has severely constrained
efficiency.  As a result, improvements in the performance are marginal.
Policies Affecting Labor Market and Quality of Labor
43.  One  important  characteristic of  the East Asian  experience  is  the
prevalence of a flexible labor  market (see  The East Asian Miracle Study (1993)).
Unlike in many developing countries including Sri Lanka, governments in these
countries did not intervene seriously to  distort the  working of the labor market
either  through wage or employment regulations.  Employment and remuneration
decisions were largely demand  driven.  A rapid  pace of economic  growth, including
in agriculture, supported the  growth of employment and incomes.  In contrast to
this, the labor market in Sri Lanka has not functioned as effectively.
44.  Broadly  speaking, Sri Lanka's  labor market  could be  grouped  into two
segments: a regulated segment with an estimated third of total employment and an
unregulated segment involving the remainder.7 The regulated segment comprises
of workers  in  the  state-owned plantations  (7% of  total  employment),  civil
servants (12%  of total  employment)  and employees  of large  private firms  and state
corporations  (15%  of  total  employment)  . The  state-owned  plantations  is
segregated from the rest of the labor market with virtually no labor mobility.
Both  employment  and  wage  decisions  are  regulated  here,  resulting  in  low
unemployment as well as high  wages relative  to productivity.  Similarly there is
both  excess  employment  (especially  school  teachers),  as  well  as  higher
remuneration than in the private sector for given levels of skill or education,
in the civil service and state corporations.  Wages of private firms in the
regulated  market are subject to minimum wages while employment flexibility is
constrained by the  Termination  of  Employment of  Workmen  Act (TWA). The remaining
67% of total employment includes agriculture, informal services in urban and
rural areas and small  private enterprises in the  urban areas.  Employment in the
unregulated segment  works flexibly,  responding  generally  to  the  market  mechanism.
45.  These characteristics of the labor market have contributed to large open
unemployment in the following way :  wages are high relative to productivity in
the regulated sector resulting in excess supply of labor in this segment.  While
labor market in the unregulated segment works generally flexibly, it does not
fully clear the  excess supply  in  the  regulated  market  because  potential employees
would rather wait and seek a job in the high-paid regulated segment than get
absorbed in the low paid  (and  possibly low prestige  ) job in the unregulated
market.  The private cost  of this  wait period is low  because families are willing
to provide this  support.  In a recent study, Rama  (1994) has provided  some
empirically  evidence which supports  this  hypothesis.  The  main  point is that  non-
market interventions have limited the flexibility  of Sri Lanka's labor market in
the organized sector which accounts for a much larger share of domestic value-
added than indicated by its employment share.
46.  Sri Lanka's labor  market distortions are compounded  by the relatively low
quality of skills,  notwithstanding its  strong commitment  and progress with human
development.  This partly relates to the weak quality of general education, but
also reflects problems with labor training.  These issues have been analyzed in
detail  in  a  recent  World  Bank  study  (1994) and  only  the main  issues  are
summarized here.
Recent studies of Sri Lanka's labor market include Patricia Alailima
(1992)  and Martin Rama (1994).- 25  -
47.  In  the area  of  general  education, concerns  with the  low quality reflect
the interaction of a number of factors.  First, as result of excessive number of
teachers, much of the public spending on education is concentrated on teacher
salaries,  leaving  little  resources  for purchasing  essential  materials  and
supplies.  Second, as a result  of  deemphasis of  English language  and not adequate
emphasis on science, school graduates are unable to respond to market demand for
skills.  Third, there are also concerns about the low quality and motivation of
teachers.  Regarding vocational training, the main difficulty is the poor link
between the  publicly owned training  institutes  and employers. As a result, there
is a mismatch between what the employers need and what the training institutes
produce.  The prevalence of the TWA (termination  of workers act) also works as
a deterrent to  the supply of  inhouse long-term training by employers.  The
employers fear that once they accept a trainee they may be stuck with the person
because the TWA makes it very hard to retrench workers.
V. Implications for the Future Growth Strategy
48.  The analysis of the previous two sections is quite revealing.  Sri Lanka's
weaker growth performance relative to the East Asian countries can be explained
by differences in  the policy framework. Like the  East Asian economies, Sri Lanka
put a lot of emphasis on human  development and equitable distribution of income.
These policies did pay off handsomely in terms of strong human development and
reduction in consumption poverty.  But Sri Lanka was unable to fully exploit its
good human capital base to grow as rapidly as the high-performing East Asian
economies.  There are a number of reasons for this.  Thus as compared with the
East Asian economies, Sri Lanka's overall investment rate and its productivity
has been  lower;  the domestic  saving rate was very  low; the performance  of
agriculture has been weak;  and exports performance has on average been  less
impressive.  These reflect the effects of  policy weaknesses in a number of
critical areas:  weak macroeconomic management reflected in relatively higher
fiscal  and  balance  of  payments  deficit  and  higher  inflation; weak  public
expenditure management;  mixed performance on exchange  rate management,  with
periods of  substantial overvaluation;  a  long  period of  trade  protection, followed
by trade  liberalization on a  rather selective basis  (agriculture incentives
remain distorted); financial sector policies that continue to hamper efficient
financial intermediation despite some recent improvements;  agriculture policies
that have been least reformed over the past 30 years and continue to constrain
agriculture performance; and relatively low flexibility of labor market.  Even
in the area of human development, there are concerns relating to the quality of
the labor force.
49.  The implications for future policy reforms are obvious.  These are
summarized below.
Macroeconomic Adjustment
(a)  A  major  challenge  for  Sri  Lanka  in  the  coming years  will  be  to
squarely address its macroeconomic imbalances.  The fiscal deficit is
unsustainably large.  Sri Lanka cannot continue to run a deficit in
its primary budget balance for any substantial period in the future
without  running  into  a  financial  crisis.  So,  Stern  (1994) has
correctly argued the need to convert the  primary deficit into a small
surplus to maintain internal balance.  The magnitude of the fiscal
effort is in the range of 4-5% of GDP.  This reduction in the fiscal
deficit will need to come mostly from a reduction in the level of
public spending.  As noted, earlier, the tax effort in Sri Lanka is
quite good.  Although  the total  revenues  can be  increased by  an
additional  percentage  of  GDP  or  so  through  improvements  in  cost
recovery of public services, some three percentage point of GDP will
need to come from expenditure rationalization.- 26  -
(b)  The scope for expenditure rationalization in the immediate short-term
may  be  somewhat  constrained,  but  over  the  medium-term  it  is
substantial.  Priorities include cutting defense expenditure through
a  resolution  of  the  civil  conflict;  rationalizing  public
administration  including  the  pensions  system;  eliminating  the
budgetary burden of public enterprises through faster implementation
of the Government's privatization program, and increasing efficiency
and  cost  recovery  in  enterprises  that will  remain  in  the  public
sector.  Reduction of fiscal deficit will also reduce expenditure on
interest payments, which  is currently a  source of  the instability
problem.
(c)  Lower fiscal deficit will help reduce inflation through reduction in
excess demand resulting from excess money supply.  In recent years,
Sri Lanka has moved toward a more open economy in areas of both trade
and finance. The monetary implications  of the  resultant capital flows
has become a major  headache for monetary management.  Although the
available evidence on whether an independent monetary policy can at
all be pursued in Sri Lanka in today's open economy environment is
unclear, it is obvious that a coordinated fiscal and monetary policy
is critical for reducing inflation and managing the  interest rate
policy.  Recent experiments with sterilization policy in Sri Lanka
have demonstrated the  difficulties of relying excessively on monetary
policy  instruments.  Reduction  in excess  domestic  liquidity  will
require a strong fiscal adjustment.
(d)  The management of exchange rate improved considerably in the 1980s,
with the unification of the exchange rate and the move to a crawling
peg  adjustment mechanism.  But  a  combination of  large  government
spending  and  large  capital  flows,  especially  official  aid,  has
generated pressure on the real exchange rate  (RER) to appreciate.
There is  a substantial  risk that continued  RER appreciations will hurt
exports, so  a vigilance on RER movements is  needed to avoid this risk.
A reduction  in government spending and lower fiscal deficits will
again help.  Careful management of foreign aid and private  capital
flows will be necessary to avoid large demand pressure in the non-
traded sector.  Financial deepening through further financial sector
deregulation will also assist in  avoiding an appreciation of the RER.
Trade and Industrial Policies
so.  The reform of trade and other policies designed to  promote industrial
development has been the subject  of debate in Sri Lanka and outside.  Supporters
of government intervention argue that  many of the  East Asian economies have used
trade,  fiscal  and  financial  instruments  selectively  to  promote  specific
industries (see  for example, Wignaraja and Kelegama (1991)  and Abeyratne(1989).
As noted in the East Asia Miracle Study (1993),  while this indeed has been the
case the favorable results cannot be expected to be automatic.  Governments of
Japan,  Korea,  Taiwan  and  China  selectively promoted  capital-and  knowledge-
intensive industries, they also took steps to ensure that they were promoting
profitable,  internationally  competitive  firms.  Moreover,  their  industrial
policies incorporated a large  amount of market information  and used  performance,
usually export performance, as a yardstick.  There are many counter examples
where efforts to promote specific industries did not work (e.g.,  Brazil, India)
because of inability to apply the market test of  profitability and competition.
Sri Lanka's  own experience with trade protection has  shown the pitfalls  of
relying on government intervention for industrial development.  On the other
hand, the positive response to liberalization policies in the 1989-93 period
suggest the  potential benefits  of further liberalization. So, it  would seem that
Sri Lanka's development objectives would be better served through reliance on
neutral incentives.  The reforms suggested below are based on this premise.- 27 -
(a)  Notwithstanding good  progress in liberalizing  trade  policies, there is
substantial  scope  for  further  reducing  the  bias  against  exports
induced by the trade policy regime.  While many of the quantitative
restrictions have been eliminated,  a number of restrictions affecting
particularly agriculture remain in  place.  Moreover, a combination of
specific duties, surcharges, exemptions and  waivers has resulted in a
fairly complex tariff regime.  These have continued to impart a bias
against exports and generally reduce investment efficiency.  Future
trade  policy  reforms  should  concentrate  on  eliminating  most
quantitative  restrictions,  further  reducing tariff  protection  and
simplifying the tariff structure.  To ensure proper implementation of
these reforms, a reform of the customs department may also be needed.
Options here include use of external assessment firms  (such as the
SGS) for preshipment inspection.  Other countries, such as Indonesia,
have successfully used this option to  minimize leakages and abuse.
(b)  Sri Lanka  continues to rely on a number of fiscal incentives  (tax
holidays and import duty exemptions) to promote private investment,
especially in the  manufacturing sector.  Particularly, since  1990, Sri
Lanka  has  offered  generous  tax  incentives  to  promote  foreign
investment and exports.  A number of recent studies have shown the
problems with the use of these fiscal incentives in Sri Lanka [World
Bank (1994);  FIAS (1992)].  First, since tax holidays are granted on
a case by case basis, they are difficult to monitor for fraud and
evasion.  Second, firm level survey results suggest that many firms
obtain tax holidays to subsidize investment that they would have made
even without the incentive. Third, potential foreign investors regard
country risk and labor cost  adjusted for  productivity as more relevant
factors  than fiscal incentives.  Finally, the  recent policy to use tax
incentives to encourage garment firms to locate in remote areas with
inadequate infrastructure has generated serious efficiency problems.
Overall,  these  incentives  distorted  resource  allocation  and
contributed  to  macroeconomic imbalance  by  reducing  budgetary revenues.
In  light of these problems, a better  policy option would be to replace
tax  holidays  with:  (i) a  low  flat  corporate  rate  of  taxation
consistent  with  international standards;  and  (ii) limited  use  on
investment tax credit aimed at new investments which are consistent
with Sri Lanka's long-term development needs.
(c)  Sri Lanka has come a long  way in  deregulating its investment licensing
regulations.  However, a  number of regulatory  restrictions in the area
of  employment,  exit and  bankruptcy procedures  continue  to  impede
investment in  manufacturing and  services.  Along  with  efforts  to
eliminate distortions in the labor market  (see below) the Companies
Act  and  the Bankruptcy  Law needs  to be  simplified  and made  more
flexible to facilitate winding up of business when needed.
(d)  A notable feature of the East Asia experience is good communication
between  the  government  and  business  which  contributed  to  the
development of a business-friendly environment  [see The East Asian
Miracle  (1993)].  In  addition  to  a  generally  favorable  business
environment,  formal  mechanisms  were  established  in  a  number  of
countries  to have  regular consultation  between government  and business
on relevant policies.  The  focus was on improving competition and
sharing information, rather than collusive behavior for rent seeking.
Similar consultative arrangement between private sector and the Sri
Lankan government might be very useful in disseminating information,
developing  right  policies  and  building  consensus,  and  proper
implementation of policies.- 28  -
Financial Sector Policies
51.  Greater  financial  deepening  will  need  to  be  a  key  objective  of
financial  sector reform.  This  will  require reforms  aimed  at increasing  financial
intermediation  activities  and  improving  the  efficiency  of  financial
intermediation on both demand and supply side.  Sri Lanka has moved well in
deregulating interest rates.  The main constraint that remains is the dominance
of inefficient, state-owned banks.  Despite poor financial performance, these
banks  have  continued  to  dominate  the  financial  sector  because  of  various
government support  including  privileged access  to  deposit  sources. The resultant
lack  of competitive  pressure has reduced  both the level  and quality of financial
intermediation.  Quality has suffered due to two reasons.  First, they have been
used  as  instruments  of  government  policy  to  direct  credit  to  politically
determined  beneficiaries,  often  without  regard  to  financial  or  economic
viability.  Second,  these  banks  have  played  the  role  of  market-makers  in
determining domestic lending rates.  Consequently, while inefficiency resulting
from over-staffing and bad portfolio has raised the cost of doing business, the
effect of these inefficiencies  have often been passed on the borrowers in terms
of  higher loan rates.  As a result the spread  between average deposit and lending
rate has been very high.
(a)  Recent steps to increase  competition  has included  efforts to legislate
a  banking reform act that  would provide greater autonomy to the state-
owned banks and place the  private commercial  banks on the same footing
as the  two state-owned banks.  A speedy implementation of this  measure
will be an important first step.  Nevertheless, this by itself will
not be adequate.  The main  policy change that is  needed to enhance the
dynamism of the financial sector is to privatize the two state banks.
(b)  Along  with  this key  reform, steps will  also need  to be  taken  to
strengthen supervision capacity of  the Central Bank to  ensure the
soundness of the banking sector in a more competitive environment.
(c)  Sri Lanka's small but growing capital market has shown dynamism in
recent  years as direct foreign investment  has  been growing in response
to  the various  deregulation  measures.  Nevertheless,  the  state's
control over the use of insurance and pensions  fund has tended to
reduce  the effectiveness of the  capital  market. Not surprisingly, most
of resources mobilized  in these institutions have been  channelled
toward  the purchase  of T-bills  to  reduce the  cost  of  the budget
deficit.  The privatization  of insurance companies has been  under
consideration for sometimes as a way of increasing competition and
efficiency in  insurance.  Implementation of  this reform will also
benefit capital market development by allowing more flexible use of
insurance funds.  Similarly, an independently managed public pensions
fund is  also likely to help the  capital  market as investment decisions
are likely to be guided by profitability considerations rather than
dictated by  the need to finance the budget deficit at  lower  cost
(i.e.,  purchase of T-bills).
Agriculture Sector Policies
52.  In the plantation  sector, the main challenge  is to privatize  the
plantations and eliminate government involvement in wage setting.  In the non-
plantation  agriculture,  reform  of  trade policies  are  essential  to  promote
diversification and growth.  In addition, reforms are needed  in a number of
areas, land reforms, marketing reforms, better use of water resources and more
effective research and extension services.  These points are developed in some
more detail below.- 29 -
(a)  It is clear from the experience of the reform efforts of the past two
years  that privatization  of  the plantations  is  the key  to  their
renewed  profitability.  Given  political  sensitivity,  the
implementation  can  be  phased  over  through  a  system  of  long-term
management contracts (50  years or more) and gradual sale of assets in
the form of shares.  At the same time, the Government should remove
all remaining restrictions on marketing, refrain from involvement in
wage  setting  and restructure research institutes to allow greater
private sector involvement.
(b)  The most important trade policy issue affecting agriculture concerns
the control of rice trade. There are also restrictions on import of
wheat, potatoes, chillies and onions.  Except in the case of wheat,
the main aim of trade controls has been to protect farmer incentives.
As  noted earlier,  the impact of these policies  has been  a  fairly
distorted production pattern.  As in the case of the manufacturing
sector, neutral incentives would probably be better for agriculture
performance than guiding specific  production activities through trade
protection.  Even in agriculture, a small economy like Sri Lanka will
likely  benefit  more  from  opening  up  to  trade.  Reconciling  the
objectives  of  food security  and protection  of  farmer  income with
production efficiency considerations could involve some trade-offs,
but these can be made consistent with outward orientation.  Thus,
while lower trade protection for rice, onions, potatoes and chillies
could hurt producers in the short-term, the medium-term gains from
diversification  toward other,  more  efficient  crops  would  likely
improve total income from agriculture.  In addition, rice and other
farmers  facing  lower  protection  need  not  lose  if better  support
services are provided to enable improvements in productivity.
(c)  Changes  in  trade  policy  alone  will  not  lead  to  successful
diversification in agriculture.  A major constraint that needs to be
addressed as  well is the lack  of a well-functioning land market due to
the state's role as the dominant landlord, restrictions on land sale
and  use,  and  inadequate  land  registry.  The  Government  has  been
working on a legislation to facilitate land titling and to speedily
resolve land disputes.  This effort should be translated into action
as soon as possible.  In addition, the following measures need to be
considered:  (i) for  new  settlers  in  colonization  schemes,  give
outright  grants  without  any  subsequent  restrictions  on  use  and
transferability of the land; (ii)  for existing settlers, convert all
permits to land grants as soon as possible and eliminate restrictions
on land use and transfers;  (ii)  properly disseminate the rulings of
the  Agrarian Services  Amendment  Act of 1991,  by  which all restrictions
on land use were removed; and (iv)  prepare a program to divest to the
private  sector  all  government-owned  land  presently  devoted  to
agriculture.
(d)  While making land and product markets work better is essential, the
availability of efficient support services is also necessary to boost
value-added  in  agriculture.  The  main  needs  are  (i) make  more
efficient use of irrigation water through better O&M, supported by
cost  recovery  and  farmer  involvement  in  canal  maintenance;  (ii)
strengthen  research  and  extension  by  allocating  more  budgetary
resources, greater outreach effort to disseminate research findings,
involving users in determining the research agenda, and using private
sector  research  facilities;  (iii) make  a  careful  review of  rural
infrastructure needs, particularly rural roads, and support priority
needs through public expenditures;  (iv) a careful review of rural
financing services is  needed; based on this review there  may be a need
to  support  the development  of rural  financing  institutions.  The
nature of this support should be based on lessons of experience from- 30 -
other countries (e.g.  the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the Kuppedes in
Indonesia).
Enhancing the Flexibility of Labor Markets and Labor Quality
53.  Policies for enhancing the flexibility  of labor market and quality of
labor would be essential to support higher growth.  Regarding labor market, the
main aim of policy reform should  be to remove the  distortions that constrain the
flexibility of labor market in  both the public sector and the large enterprises
in  the  private  sector.  Admittedly,  reforms  here  will  present  a  major
implementation challenge in  view of political sensitivities.  While this calls
for a sensitive handling of the underlying reforms, failure to implement the
reforms might constrain Sri  Lanka's ability to attain the  NICs status.  Policies
for labor quality enhancement would need to  address the concerns in both general
education and vocational training.
(a)  In the public sector,  policy challenges for improving the flexibility
of  labor  market  involves  the  following:  (i)  remove  government
involvement in wage and employment decisions in the plantations and
other public corporations, and let these be based on profitability
considerations; (ii)  rationalize civil service hiring on the basis of
needs  rather  than  political  expediency;  and  (iii)  align  wage
adjustments to reflect productivity and budgetary prudence.
(b)  In the private sector, the main task needed to increase labor market
flexibility is to remove the TWA.
54.  Regarding labor quality, policies would need to address concerns in both
general education and vocational training. The main reforms include:
(a)  There  is a need to  improve the composition of public  spending  on
primary and secondary  education.  As noted, at  present most resources
go to finance teacher salaries, leaving  very little for  materials and
supplies.  Teachers are generally in excess supply in the cities.  So
a reduction in the number of teachers in the cities will reduce the
salary bill and release resources for essential school supplies and
materials.
(b)  Greater emphasis on science and English as a second language will
improve the ability of students to respond better to the needs of the
job market.  More generally, a careful review of the curriculum and
appropriate revisions in light of Sri Lanka's development needs and
market demand will help improve the quality of human capital.
(c)  Efforts to enhance the quality of trainers--the teachers--are also
needed.
(d)  Sri  Lanka  needs  to  rethink  its  skill  development  program.
International evidence  shows that  training  programs are  most likely  to
succeed  when  sponsored  and  or  implemented  in  collaboration  with
prospective  employers. There are various ways how  Sri Lanka could
reorganize its training programs to make it demand based. The main
need  is  to  ensure  a  strong  involvement  of  the  private  sector
(employers)  in the  design and implementation  of  the training programs.- 31 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abeyratne,  Srimal  (1989).  "Industrialization  in the NICs  and  in Sri  Lanka:  Why
the NICs  succeeded  and Sri Lanka Failed?",  Upanathi  (Sri Lanka)  Vol.  4, Nos.
1&2.
Alailima,  Patricia  J.  (1992).  "Education-Employment  Linkages:  The  Macro
Profile",  Sri Lanka  Journal  of  Social  Science,  Vol.  15, Nos.  1&2.
Alesina,  Alberto  and  Dani  Rodrik  (1994).  "Distributive  Politics  and  Economic
Growth",  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics.
Athukorala,  Premchandra  and  J.S.  Bandara  (1989).  "Growth  of  Manufactured
Exports,  Primary  Commodity  Dependence  and Net Export  Earnings:  Sri Lanka".
World  Development,  Vol.  17, No
and  Sarath  Rajapatirana  (1993).  "Domestic  Financial  Market  and  the Trade
Liberalization  Outcome:  Evidence  from  Sri Lanka".  World  Development,  Vol.
21,  No.  7.
Baffes,  John  and Anwar  Shah  (1993).  "Productivity  of Public  Spending,  Sectoral
Allocation  Choices  and Economic  Growth".  Policy  Research  Working  Papers,
No.  1178,  World  Bank.
Barro,  Robert  J.  (1991).  "Economic  Growth  in  a  Cross  Section  of  Countries".
Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  Vol.  106.
Bhalla,  S.S.  (1988).  "Is Sri Lanka  an Exception?  A Comparative  Study  of Living
Standards"  in Rural  Poverty  in South Asia,  T.N. Srinivasan  and P. K. Bardhan
edited.  Columbia  University  Press,  New  York.
and  Paul  Glewwe  (1986).  "Growth  and  Equity  in Developing  Countries:  A
Reinterpretation  of  the  Sri  Lankan  Experience".  World  Bank  Economic
Review,  Vol.  1, No.  1.
and  Ashok  K. Lahiri  (1986)  . Effects  of Agricultural  Price  Policy  in Sri
Lanka.  The  World  Bank.
Bond  Marian  E.  (1985).  "Export  Demand  and  Supply  for  Groups  of  Non-oil
Developing  Countries".  IMF  Staff  Papers,  Vol.  32,  No.  1.
Bruton,  Henry  J.  and  World  Bank  (1992).  The  Political  Economy  of  Poverty,
Equity  and Growth:  Sri Lanka  and Malaysia.  Published  for the World  Bank  by
Oxford  University  Press,  1992.
Central  Bank  of Sri  Lanka,  Annual  Report,  Various  Issues.
Cho,  Yoon-Je  and Deena  Khatkhate  (1989).  Lessons  of Financial  liberalization  in
Asia:  A  Comparative  Study.  World  Bank  Discussion  Papers,  Number  50.
Clarke,  George  R.G  (1993).  "More  Evidence  on  Income  Distribution  and  Growth".
Working  Paper  Series  #1064,  Policy  Research  Department,  The World  Bank.
Coorey,  Sharmini  A  (1986).  "Growth  and Adjustment  After  Trade  Liberalization  in
Sri  Lanka".  Marga  Quarterly  Journal  (Sri Lanka)  Vol.  8, No.  2.
Cyrus,  Sassanpour  and  Ichiro  Otani  (1988).  "Financial,  Exchange  Rate,  and Wage
Policies  in Singapore,  1979-86",  Staff  Papers,  International  Monetary  Fund,
Vol.  35.
De Long  J.B  and  Lawrence  H.  Summers  (1991).  "Equipment  Investment  and  Economic
Growth".  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  Vol.  106.- 32  -
Dias,  Sriyani  (1991).  "Economic  Liberalization  and  the  Development  of
Manufacturing  in Sri Lanka".  Asian  Survey  (U.S.)  31.
Dollar,  David  (1990).  "Outward  Orientation  and Growth:  An Empirical  Study  Using
a  Price-Based  Measure  of  Openness",  East  Asia  and  Pacific  Region,  World
Bank.
(1992).  "Outward-Oriented  Developing  Economies  Really  Do  Grow  more
Rapidly:  Evidence  from  95  LDCs,  1976-1985",  Economic  Development  and
Cultural  Change,  Vol  40.
Dorrance,  G.S.  (1966)  . "Inflation  and Growth:  The Statistical  Evidence",  Staff
Papers,  Vol.  13.  International  Monetary  Fund.
Dunham,  David  (1993).  "Crop  Diversification  and  Export  Growth:  Dynamics  of
Change  in Sri Lankan  Peasant  Sector".  Development  and Change  (Netherlands)
24.
Easterly,  William  (1993).  "How Much  Do Distortions  Affect  Growth?".  Journal  of
Monetary  Economics,  Vol.  32.
and  Sergio  Rebelo  (1993).  "Fiscal  Policy  and  Economic  Growth:  An
Empirical  Investigation".  NBER  Working  Paper  No.  4499.
,  Robert  King,  Ross  Levine,  and  Sergio  Rebelo  (1992).  "How  do  National
Policies  affect  Long-run  Growth?  A Research  Agenda",  World  Bank  Discussion
Paper  #164.
Edwards,  Sebastian  (1988).  Exchange  Rate  Misalignment  in Developing  Countries,
Occasional  Paper  No.2  /  New  Series,  World  Bank.
(1989)  . "Openness,  Outward  Orientation,  Trade  Liberalization,  and  Economic
Performance  in Developing  Countries",  PPR Working  Paper No. 191, World  Bank.
Farrington,  J.  (1986).  "Induced  Innovation  Hypothesis:  Intra-Country
Applications  to India and  Sri Lanka".  Marga  Quarterly  Journal  (Sri Lanka)
8, No.  3.
Fry,  Maxwell  J.  (1988).  Money,  Interest,  and  Banking  in Economic  Development.
Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  Baltimore,  Md.
Gelb,  Alan  H.  (1989).  "Financial  Policies,  Growth  and  Efficiency".  Policy
Research  Working  Paper  No.  202,  World  Bank.
Goldsmith,  R.W.  (1969).  Financial  Structure  and Development.  Yale  University
Press,  New  Haven.
Harberger,  Arnold  C.  (1988).  Trade  Policy  and the Real  Exchange  Rate.  Economic
Development  Institute,  World  Bank.
Havrylshyn,  Oli  (1985)  . "The  Direction  of  Developing  Country  Trade:  Empirical
Evidence",  Journal  of Development  Economics,  Vol.  19.
Isenman,  Paul  (1987)  . "A Comment  on "Growth  and Equity  in Developing  Countries:
A  Reinterpretation  of  the  Sri  Lankan  Experience",  By Bhalla  and  Glewwe".
The  World  Bank  Economic  Review,  Vol.  1, No.  3.
. (1980).  "Basic  Needs:  The Case of Sri Lanka".  World  Development  Report,
Vol.  8.
International  Monetary  Fund.  Government  Finance  Statistics,  Various  Issues.- 33  -
____  . International  Financial  Statistics,  Various  Issues.
Jayalath,  J.B.A.D.  (1992).  Macroeconomic  Effects  of Stabilization  Programmes:
Observations  on the Sri Lankan  Economy  1965-85.  University  of New  England.
Faculty  of  Economic  Studies.  Occasional  Papers  in Economic  Development
(Australia)  No.  48.
Jayasuriya,  Gamini  W.  (1981)  "Development  Oriented  Agricultural  Price  Policy
for  Sri  Lanka",  Israel  Journal  of Development  (Israel)  6, No.  4.
Jayasuriya,  S.K.  and  P. Athukoralge  (1987)  . Macroeconomic  Policies,  Crisis  and
Growth  in the  Long  Run:  Sri  Lanka  (Colombo,  School  of Economics,  La Trobe
University),  1987.
Jayawardena,  Lal,  Anne  Maasland,  and  P.N.  Radhakrishnan  (1987).  Stabilization
and  Adjustment  Policies  and  Programmes--Sri  Lanka.  World  Institute  for
Development  Economic  Research,  Finland.
Kelagama,  Saman  and  Ganeshan  Wignaraja.  (1989)  "Trade  Policy  and  Industrial
Development  in Sri Lanka".
Korale  ,  R. B. M.  (1990)  . A Statistical  Overview  of Employment  and Unemployment
Trends.  Institute  of Policy  Studies,  Employment  Series  5, Colombo.
Levine,  Ross  and  David  Renelt  (1991).  "Cross-Country  Studies  of  Growth  and
Policy".  PRE working  papers  # 608,  The  World  Bank.
(1992).  "A  Sensitivity  Analysis  of  Cross-Country  Growth  Regressions".
American  Economic  Review,  Vol.  82, No  4.
Lucas,  Robert  E.  (1988).  "On the Mechanics  of Economic  Development",  Journal  of
Monetary  Economics,  Vol.  XXV,  No.  2.
McKinnon,  Ronald  I. (1973).  Money  and Capital  in Economic  Development,  Brookings
Institution,  Washington  D.  C.
National  Planning  Division,  Sri  Lanka.  A  Review  of  Prices  and  Agricultural
Incentives.  Colombo,  Sri  Lanka.
Rajapatirana,  Sarath  (1988)  . "Foreign  Trade  and  Economic  Development:  Sri
Lanka's  Experience".  World  Development,  Vol.16,  No.  10.
Rama, Martin  (1994). "Flexibility  in Sri Lanka's  Labor Market".  Policy  Research
Working  Paper  4 1262,  World  Bank.
Romer,  Paul  (1986).  "Increasing  Returns  and  Long  Run  Growth",  Journal  of
Political  Economy,  Vol.  94.
Sen,  Amarty  K.  (1988).  "Sri  Lanka  Achievements:  How  and  When"  in Rural  Poverty
in South Asia,  T.N. Srinivasan  and P. K. Bardhan  edited,  Columbia  University
Press,  New  York.
(1981).  "Public  Action  and  the  Quality  of  Life  in  Developing  Countries".
Oxford  Bulletin  of Economics  and  Statistics,  Vol.  43.
Shumway,  C.  Richard,  Kandiah  Jegasothy,  and  William  P.  Alexander  (1987)
"Production  Interrelationships  in  Sri  Lankan  Peasant  Agriculture".
Australian  Journal  of Agricultural  Economics,  31.
Stern,  Nicholas  (1993).  "Tax Reform  in Sri Lanka".  Working  Paper  Series  IPR76,
Institute  for  Policy  Reform,  Washington  D.C.- 34  -
Thorbecke,  Erik and Jan Svejnar  (1987).  Economic Policies and Agricultural
Performance in  Sri Lanka, 1960-1984.  Paris  Development Centre of the OECD.
Weerasekera, Y.M.W.B.  (1985) "Tariff  Reform and Effective protection: The Case
of  Some  Selected  Industries after  1984 Tariff  Reform".  Staff  Studies,
Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
White,  Howard  and  Ganeshan  Wignaraja  (1992).  "Exchange  Rates,  Trade
Liberalization and Air: The Sri Lankan Experience".  World Development,
Vol. 20
White, Howard  and Ganeshan Wignaraja  (1991).  "Nominal and Real Devaluation
During Trade Liberalisation: Aid Induced  Dutch Disease in  Sri Lanka".  LD'A
- QEH Development Studies Working Papers (Italy)  No. 38.
Wickramsinghe, J.W.  (1985).  A Theory of Multiple Exchange Rates and Exchange
Rate Management in Sri Lanka, Central Bank of Ceylon.
Wickramsinghe, J.W. (1992).  "Trade  As An Engine of Growth--First Gear--Case of
Sri  Lanka".  Asian Economic Review:  The Journal of the Indian Institute of
Economics, Vol. 34
Wignaraja,  Ganeshan  (1990).  "Industrialization  and  Social  Development:
Comparisons of South Asia with East Asian NICs".  Marga Quarterly Journal
(Sri  Lanka) Vol. 11, No. 1.
World  Bank.  World  Development  Report,  Various  Issues.  The  Johns  Hopkins
University Press, Maryland.
World Bank  (1993).  The East Asian Miracle Study. Oxford University Press, New
York.
Yapa, L.F. (1988).  "Export  Development Policies and  Measures in Sri  Lanka: Focus
on Trade Policy".  Marga Quarterly Journal (Sri  Lanka), vol. 9, No. 3.
Yatawara, Ravindra  A.  (1990)  Trade Strategies and the Industrial  Development of
Sri Lanka since 1970. Unpublished Dissertation, Reed College, U.S.A.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  tor  paper
WPS1464  How Does the North American Free  Edward E. Leamer  May 1995  S. Vallimont
Trade Agreement Affect Central  Alfonso Guerra  37791
America?  Martin Kaufman
Boris Segura
WPS1465  Post Trade Liberalization Policy  Sarath Rajapatirana  May 1995  J. Troncoso
and Institutional Challenges in  37826
Latin America and the Caribbean
WPS1466  Ownership and Financing of  Charles D. Jacobson  June 1995  WDR
Infrastructure:  Historical  Joel A. Tarr  31393
Perspectives
WPS1467  Beyond the Uruguay Round: The  Jeffrey D. Lewis  June 1995  B. Kim
Implications of an Asian Free Trade  Sherman Robinson  82477
Area  Zhi Wang
WPS1468  Government's Role in Pakistan  Rashid Faruqee  June 1995  C. Anbiah
Agriculture: Major Reforms are Needed  81275
WPS1469  The Role of Labor Unions in Fostering  John  Pencavel  June 1995  WDR
Economic Development  31393
WPS1470  Pension Systems and Reforms:  Patricio Arrau  June 1995  E. Khine
Country Experiences and Research  Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel  37471
Issues
WPS1471Pension Reform and Growth  Giancarlo Corsetti  June 1995  E. Khine
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel  37471
WPS1472  Fiscal and Monetary Contraction in  Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel  June 1995  E. Khine
Chile: A Rational-Expectations  Luis Serven  37471
Approach
WPS1473  The Surge in Capital Inflows to  Eduardo Fernandez-Arias  June 1995
Developing Countries: Prospects and  Peter J. Montiel
Policy Response
WPS1474 Are Stable Agreements for Sharing  D. Marc Kilgour  June 1995  C. Spooner
International River Waters Now  Ariel Dinar  32116
Possible?
WPS1475  Decentralization: The Way Forward  Andrew N. Parker  June 1995  D. Housden
for Rural Development?  36637
WPS1476  Public Spending and the Poor: What  Dominique  van de Walle  June 1995  C. Bernardo
We Know, What We Need to Know  37699
WPS1477  Cities Without Land Markets:  Alain Bertaud  June 1995  L. Lewis
Location and Land Use in the  Bertrand Renaud  30539
Socialist CityPolicy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1478 Promoting  Growth  in Sri  Lanka:  Sadiq  Ahmed  June  1995  A. Bhalla
Lessons  from East  Asia  Priya  Ranjan  82168